

Capital Reporting Company
Day 16 In Re: Determination of Royalty Rates (Public) 05-18-2015


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Before the
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

Received
MAY 20 2015
Copyright Royalty Board

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In Re: : Docket No.
: 15-CRB-0001-WR
Determination of Royalty : (2016-2020)
Rates and Terms for : Volume 16-PUBLIC
Ephemeral Recording and : Pages 4184-4226
Digital Performance of : Pages 4324-4410
Sound Recordings (Web IV) : Pages 4468-4509
-----:

PUBLIC SESSION

 ORIGINAL

Washington, D.C.

Monday, May 18, 2015

The hearing in the above-entitled matter
was convened at 9:12 a.m.

BEFORE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES:

SUZANNE M. BARNETT, CHIEF JUDGE

DAVID R. STRICKLER, JUDGE

JESSE FEDER, JUDGE

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2

3 (PUBLIC SESSION)

4

5 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good morning.

6 Please be seated.

7 Mr. Klaus, you were on your feet. I

8 mean, everyone was on their feet, but you looked --

9 MR. KLAUS: I was just the slowest to

10 sit down, Your Honor. So I didn't actually have

11 anything to say.

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: You looked

13 expectant.

14 MR. POMERANTZ: May I proceed, Your

15 Honor?

16 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Yes, you may.

17 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, I have one

18 issue to raise before Mr. Larson gets started.

19 Last week, Judge Stanton of the Southern District

20 of New York issued a ruling in the BMI/Pandora rate

21 court proceeding. It is not publicly available

22 yet. It is about 50 pages long. We have been

23 trying to get access to it through Pandora's

24 counsel in this case and have, thus far, been

25 unsuccessful. We believe it may be relevant to

1 issues that we would cross-examine witnesses on
2 today, but we don't know for sure until we see the
3 opinion.

4 But, for example, Mr. Herring was a
5 witness by deposition in that case. Mr. McBride,
6 the next witness, testified about the very same
7 experiment that's at issue in this case, and I --
8 we have talked to BMI's counsel. They have told us
9 that they can provide us with the decision under
10 the protective order in this case with simply
11 redacting third party, not -- not Pandora, not BMI
12 information, but like publishers' information, and
13 they were willing to do so, but we haven't yet been
14 able to get the concurrence of -- of Pandora. So
15 we are, therefore, without the decision this
16 morning.

17 All I would request at this point in
18 time is that we have the -- you know, preserve our
19 rights on that. We may ask to recall a witness.
20 And, obviously, we'll ask permission to do that.
21 We may not need to do that. Our understanding is
22 that the decision will be made available publicly
23 later this week. Unfortunately, the three
24 witnesses for Pandora are testifying today and
25 that's why we were trying to get it before today.

1 And I just wanted to, I guess, alert the panel that
2 we asked for this decision. We have not been able
3 to get it. And so if we come back to this issue
4 later on, I just wanted to make clear that we have
5 tried.

6 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Pomerantz, in
7 general terms, what do you think the rate court
8 might have said that would be relevant to this
9 proceeding?

10 MR. POMERANTZ: It -- it may have been
11 critical of the music sales experiment that
12 Professor -- I'm sorry, that Dr. McBride will be
13 testifying about later today. It may be talking
14 about some of the same issues as to convergence or
15 other issues. There's a lot of similarities
16 between some of the issues that were being
17 litigated there and litigated here. There's also
18 differences. There's also differences.

19 And because, quite frankly, Mr. Rich --
20 neither Mr. Rich nor I know what's in the decision,
21 it leaves us a little bit hamstrung as to know
22 whether it really is relevant to what's going on
23 here today. I was just hoping to know that before
24 we cross-examine these witnesses.

25 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I just wanted to

1 make sure that you weren't talking about anything
2 having to do with the rates themselves.

3 MR. POMERANTZ: No, no, no, no. No,
4 no. Not the rates themselves.

5 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Mr. Rich.

6 MR. RICH: Thank you.

7 If I may put a little further context
8 on this. That is a Federal District Court
9 proceeding under the auspices of the government
10 consent decree regulating BMI, involving different
11 copyright rights, involving the value of the BMI
12 repertoire for the musical works performing rate.
13 A separate record -- separate counsel. We are not
14 involved in that case. The decision was issued
15 under seal subject to a set of procedures set forth
16 by Judge Stanton working with outside counsel to
17 identify potentially redacted material that will
18 work its way through in the ordinary course,
19 notwithstanding counsel for BMI's characterization
20 of what could and could not be released. Our
21 understanding is it would have been entirely
22 inappropriate privately to provide some, even if we
23 were in a position to, which we're not, some
24 version prior to that process playing out. It's
25 purely speculative as to what, if any, relevance

1 there would be to any witness appearing here today.
2 I can't speculate to what I think. It's highly
3 unlikely and tangential.

4 Needless to say, if upon the public
5 release of that document Mr. Pomerantz feels there
6 is some basis for having some further colloquy
7 about it as opposed to, perhaps, briefing its
8 consequences in the post trial briefing, we would
9 be happy to discuss it at that time.

10 MR. POMERANTZ: That's fine, Your
11 Honor.

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.

13 I do think, Mr. Pomerantz, it may be a
14 bit premature. I mean, even though we are not all
15 powerful, please be reminded that we do have the
16 ability to call witnesses on our own if we feel
17 it's necessary or -- and appropriate. It's not
18 something we're planning to do right now, either,
19 because we're all operating in a vacuum.

20 So, if necessary, you can raise the
21 issue again later and we can deal with it in
22 that -- at that time in some appropriate way.

23 Good morning, Mr. Larson.

24 MR. LARSON: Good morning.

25 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Herring, you

1 remain under oath.

2 MR. LARSON: Yes. Thank you.

3 May I hand out some binders here?

4 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Oh, good.

5 MR. LARSON: Wouldn't be a day at CRB
6 without binders.

7 There are demonstratives inside.

8 Tucked inside of the binders are a small set of
9 demonstratives, as well.

10 MICHAEL HERRING,

11 having been previously duly sworn, to tell the
12 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
13 testified as follows:

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR PANDORA

15 BY MR. LARSON:

16 Q. Welcome back, Mr. Herring.

17 A. Thank you.

18 Q. We're here today to discuss your
19 written direct testimony; is that correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Okay. And that appears in the binder
22 in front of you, is the tab identified as Pandora
23 Exhibit 5007; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And can you just check for me on the

1 last page that that's your signature on the
2 exhibit?

3 A. It is.

4 MR. LARSON: Your Honor, we'd offer
5 Pandora Exhibit 5007 into evidence.

6 MR. KLAUS: No objection, Your Honor.

7 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: 5007 is admitted.

8 (Pandora Exhibit No. 5007 was admitted
9 into evidence.)

10 MR. LARSON: And we would also offer
11 Pandora Exhibits 5008 through 5015, which are also
12 in the binder, in evidence.

13 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: 5008 through
14 what?

15 MR. LARSON: 5015.

16 Yeah, 08 through 15.

17 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: 15, okay. Thank
18 you.

19 MR. KLAUS: And, I believe, Your Honor,
20 these were the exhibits to Mr. Herring's direct
21 testimony. We do object on hearsay grounds to the
22 newspaper article that's attached at 5011 and the
23 newspaper article that's attached at 5013. No
24 objection to the documents coming in as evidence of
25 what was stated in a newspaper article, but we do

1 object to consideration of any of the statements
2 therein for their truth.

3 MR. LARSON: Your Honor, we disclosed
4 these exhibits to SoundExchange on their objections
5 to the exhibit list that they sent to us. They did
6 not include a hearsay objection. So we believe
7 that objection is moot.

8 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: The objection is
9 overruled. We will give whatever weight they are
10 due.

11 MR. LARSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 BY MR. LARSON:

13 Q. Mr. Herring, could you take a look at
14 Slide 1 on the demonstratives in front of you?

15 A. Yes.

16 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I'm sorry.
17 Before you do that -- thank you, Judge Feder. 5008
18 through 5015 inclusive are admitted.

19 (Pandora Exhibit Nos. 5008 and 5015
20 were admitted into evidence.)

21 BY MR. LARSON:

22 Q. Mr. Herring, do you recognize Slide 1
23 as the topics covered in your written direct
24 testimony?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. And am I correct that you
2 testified to a number of these topics when you were
3 here testifying about your written rebuttal
4 testimony?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Which topic on the slide will you be
7 focusing on today?

8 A. The first bullet, the Pandora-Merlin
9 agreement.

10 Q. Okay. Let's talk about that.

11 Did there come a time when Pandora
12 decided to explore the feasibility of direct
13 licensing with record labels as an alternative to
14 securing rights to the statutory license?

15 A. Well, yes. And at that time, actually,
16 preceded my working at Pandora sometime in 2012,
17 but has been an initiative at Pandora since the --
18 you know, for my entire time at the company.

19 Q. And what was Pandora's rationale for
20 considering direct licensing?

21 A. Well, we believed that we would like to
22 have better partnerships with the music labels and
23 music publishers and we also believed that we could
24 do deals with the music labels specifically where
25 we provided terms that might create lower prices

1 for the, you know, lower royalty rates for the
2 music that we played, and we were looking for a way
3 to introduce price differentiation into our
4 business model.

5 Q. When you say, "price differentiation,"
6 is that the price competition that you mention in
7 Paragraph 23 of your testimony?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Were there any other sort of
10 relationship benefits or relationships with artists
11 and record labels that were part of your direct
12 licensing strategy?

13 A. Yes. We have a pretty broad strategy
14 to build closer relationships with the music
15 industry with both labels and publishers. And we
16 have several initiatives that we wanted to
17 experiment with to roll out and test their
18 effectiveness, and we felt the best environment to
19 do that would be in a direct label -- in a direct
20 relationship.

21 JUDGE STRICKLER: In that regards, you
22 mentioned experiments. I want to understand the
23 time sequencing because we'll hear later from Mr.
24 McBride with regard to experiments.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

1 JUDGE STRICKLER: The experiments that
2 he's testifying to preceded the execution of the
3 Merlin agreement?

4 THE WITNESS: So I might have conflated
5 two concepts here. So I was referring there to our
6 ability to use our platform to connect artists with
7 listeners. And, in that context, you know, create
8 value and benefits for the labels and artists, you
9 know, outside of just writing a royalty check. So
10 that's things like direct messaging and promoting
11 of tours and things that they can do on our
12 platform directly with listeners.

13 The experiments you're talking about,
14 one set of those was done in 2013. The second set
15 was done in 2014, were ongoing when we actually
16 signed -- the second set was ongoing, maybe the
17 first section was done when we signed the deal with
18 Merlin.

19 JUDGE STRICKLER: Was there any
20 experiment undertaken before the Pandora-Merlin
21 agreement was executed?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. The steering
23 experiments we did in 2013 were -- preceded the
24 Merlin agreement.

25 JUDGE STRICKLER: Preceded and were

1 completed before the execution of the Merlin
2 agreement?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. Before we even
4 started negotiating.

5 BY MR. LARSON:

6 Q. That leads directly into the next
7 questions I have for you, Mr. Herring.

8 First of all, can you just explain just
9 what were the steering experiments, as you referred
10 to them?

11 A. So there's really two sets of them.
12 One set was in 2013 where we instructed our
13 engineers and data scientists to -- to experiment
14 with overspinning indie labels at various levels
15 and measure the effect on listening. So the number
16 of times listeners returned, how long they
17 listened, and whether there was a negative effect
18 on retention rates of listeners over a period of
19 time.

20 Q. And why did you run those experiments?

21 A. Well, we wanted to see -- we believed
22 that our platform is promotional. We wanted to see
23 if we could overspin above the natural rate indie
24 labels as a way of incentivizing lower payments for
25 royalties.

1 Q. Okay. When you say, "overspin," what
2 does it mean to steer towards a label or to
3 overspin them by, say, 40 percent? Can you just
4 explain.

5 A. Yeah. At a high level, it's just
6 the -- there's a natural rate that we measure that
7 a certain label's artists would spin on Pandora and
8 that does vary somewhat, but it doesn't vary a lot.
9 You know, outside of a new hit, a massive hit being
10 put into the system and being listened to a lot by
11 listeners is just relatively steady.

12 What we do is we take that natural rate
13 and let's say for just illustrative purposes a
14 label had represented one percent of our spins, if
15 we were to overspin by 40 percent, we would, you
16 know, put extra weight on that label's songs in the
17 algorithm such that they would spin 1.4 percent of
18 our spins would be made up by that overspin label.

19 JUDGE STRICKLER: You calculate an
20 actual rate based on the label's natural rate, not
21 the art -- not an artist's natural rate?

22 THE WITNESS: We do it both ways. We
23 can do it both ways.

24 JUDGE STRICKLER: Which way did you do
25 it in the experiments?

1 THE WITNESS: We did it by label.

2 BY MR. LARSON:

3 Q. Okay. And what -- looking just at the
4 first set of steering experiments, what were the
5 results of that first set?

6 A. The first set demonstrated that we
7 could overspin indie labels and we specifically
8 targeted indie labels in the first set in 2013.

9 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Is any of this
10 restricted?

11 MR. LARSON: No. I believe we can stay
12 in public record.

13 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: So I'll be careful.

15 You know, as much as 40 to 80 percent.
16 So we -- there was a lot of leeway within to -- to
17 spin indie labels much higher than their natural
18 rate.

19 BY MR. LARSON:

20 Q. And how did the second set of steering
21 experiments differ from the first?

22 A. The second set was set up to
23 specifically measure our ability to over and under
24 spin major labels by as much as 30 percent.

25 Q. Okay. So returning, again, to the

1 first steering experiments, did Pandora begin
2 approaching record labels to attempt to negotiate
3 direct licenses after that first set of steering
4 experiments?

5 A. Well, we've always been having
6 conversations with record labels, both majors and
7 indies. But we got more serious about potential
8 terms, specifically with indie labels following
9 those steering experiments where we were confident
10 we could deliver on proposed terms.

11 Q. Okay. And how did you decide who to
12 approach?

13 A. Well, you know, Pandora is about 35
14 percent of our spins generally are by indie labels
15 or not the three major labels, and so we have a
16 natural propensity to be attractive to the indie
17 labels. Indie labels view Pandora positively and
18 seemed more predisposed to do a direct deal and
19 to -- and to value the additional exposure on
20 Pandora. We just did -- although we had lots of
21 conversations with the majors, that didn't seem --
22 you know didn't seem to be taking it seriously.
23 Their offers involved adding additional services
24 like me to on-demand services to compete with
25 Spotify, et cetera, which we weren't -- was not on

1 our strategic roadmap.

2 Q. So, how did you decide to approach
3 Merlin as opposed to other independent labels?

4 A. Well, there's thousands of indie labels
5 and one of the advantages Merlin gave to Pandora
6 was the ability to negotiate with a single entity
7 and agree on a set of terms that then could be
8 adopted by thousands of their member labels. So --
9 and that was an opportunity to do a lot of deals
10 with smaller labels all at once, rather than going
11 one by one through indie labels.

12 Q. And just so the record is clear, can
13 you explain in a general level who Merlin is or
14 what Merlin is?

15 A. Yes.

16 Merlin, generally, is a consortium that
17 negotiates or that prosecutes copyright violations
18 on behalf of their membership as well as negotiates
19 licenses on be -- on, you know -- on behalf of
20 their membership that have to be opted in by the
21 members. So they will negotiate a set of terms
22 with say YouTube or Pandora, and then their members
23 can then, you know, voluntarily agree to operate
24 under those terms or not.

25 Q. Okay. And did Pandora make the first

1 sort of offer proposal in the Merlin negotiations?

2 A. We did, yes.

3 Q. And how did you arrive at the rate that
4 you initially proposed to Merlin?

5 A. Well, with a little bit of art and
6 science. Our original proposal was a unitary rate
7 of .0011, and that is a combination of, you know,
8 experience and looking at our business model and
9 finding a balance between what we thought was a
10 rate that we could thrive as a business, we could
11 still have the right investment levels based upon
12 our monetization potential, and also pay a fair
13 royalty back to the copyright holders.

14 JUDGE STRICKLER: So the .0011 was
15 initially proposed by Pandora to Merlin?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 BY MR. LARSON:

18 Q. What role, if any, did the --

19 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I'm sorry.

20 Mr. Herring, I'm curious, if you know,
21 did you propose this per-play rate because that was
22 what was extent under the CRB rules, or did you
23 consider other rate structures and then divide that
24 the per-play rate was the better of the others?

25 THE WITNESS: So you mean as a

1 structure versus a percent of revenue?

2 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Correct.

3 THE WITNESS: Okay. Because it's a
4 different rate, obviously, than what the per-play
5 rates were. There was a couple reasons why we went
6 per play versus percentage of revenue. In general,
7 it's because the percentage of revenue thresholds
8 that we thought were fair and appropriate we
9 wouldn't be -- you know, be hitting any time, you
10 know, as a -- would have already been a big drop in
11 the existing revenue that we would have paid to the
12 labels. We didn't think that -- at the time, I
13 mean in late 2013 or early 2014, you know, we're
14 paying 55 percent of revenue or so based upon on
15 the Pureplay rate at the time, and that wasn't
16 something that we would have agreed to and so that
17 -- so the percent of revenues we thought were
18 appropriate would have been impossible at the time
19 for Merlin to agree to, or, you know, would have
20 not been palatable.

21 When we looked at the Pureplay rate,
22 we're okay with Pureplay rates in the context of
23 it's a very defined cost and so that, you know, the
24 monetization becomes my problem. Right? I'm just
25 pay ing the fee to them, but it's also my

1 opportunity. So as Pandora can drive its own
2 monetization, that's how we've been able to drive
3 our gross profit up because we have, potentially, a
4 fixed rate on a per song basis.

5 JUDGE STRICKLER: At the time that you
6 proposed the .0011 per-play fee, did you have an
7 understanding of what you thought that would --
8 equilibrate to in terms of percentage of revenue
9 for Pandora on a pro rata basis for the Merlin --

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: -- labels that would
12 sign on. I realize there's a lot of moving parts
13 to it.

14 THE WITNESS: So you mean in a vacuum,
15 or if there was, you know, a hundred percent of
16 our --

17 JUDGE STRICKLER: What was your
18 projection?

19 THE WITNESS: So at the time we made
20 the initial proposal, I believe the rates we were
21 paying were .0012, so it wouldn't have been a
22 significant decrease off the ad rate. But we did
23 propose a unitary rate.

24 JUDGE STRICKLER: Well, what did you
25 think that would result in in terms of percentage

1 of revenue?

2 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

3 It probably would have been slightly
4 below -- if we were 55 percent, it would have been
5 like, you know, 52 percent of revenue, and that's
6 my approximate guess. We did the analysis, but the
7 point-in-time analysis isn't as important as how it
8 works over time when we do these sorts of deals.
9 So it's about projecting where we think our
10 monetization could go and whether that and how that
11 per-play rate impact our ability to invest and grow
12 the business.

13 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I have another
14 question.

15 THE WITNESS: Sure.

16 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Did you think
17 Merlin just wouldn't go for the percentage of
18 revenue rate because of the shock factor, or was it
19 really substantially different from what you would
20 be paying them per play?

21 THE WITNESS: The percent of revenue
22 rate historically, at least from our perspective,
23 plays a different role. So the Pureplay rate
24 ensures that the labels get paid something as our
25 model develops, maybe is the best way of putting

1 that. If it was just a percentage of revenue
2 basis, we would be accused of not driving revenue
3 high up. We still get accused of that, but
4 generally speaking, that -- because there's a
5 pure -- per-play rate -- sorry -- that that
6 protects against that. Right? That monetization
7 is important.

8 On a -- we believe that long-term
9 percent of revenue actually aligns our interest a
10 lot more directly. It's actually one of the
11 reasons when Merlin proposed the 25 percent floor
12 as a percent of revenue, we were okay with that
13 level. Even though we didn't think during the term
14 of this agreement, at least in the first two years,
15 likely in the next two years we would achieve a
16 moment where we would be paying on the percent of
17 revenue basis, we thought 25 percent of revenue was
18 a, you know, an appropriate level of revenue share
19 that where we could still invest aggressively and,
20 you know, earn a return on our investment to pay
21 off -- pay for the investing we made historically,
22 but also pay a reasonable royalty to the copyright
23 holders and let them share in the upside.

24 Now, one of the problems with the
25 per-play rate is that if we -- if I'm monetizing at

1 \$200 revenue per thousand hours, you know, all that
2 upside accrues maybe to us, and I would say it
3 sounds great for Pandora but in a world where we're
4 partners, that's not a great outcome. So it
5 protects them in the event that there's significant
6 upside on the revenue side and so they get to
7 participate in that revenue upside.

8 So finding that's part of the win-win
9 in these negotiations. We started in one place
10 that worked for us economically. We got there
11 eventually through a lot of give and take, but also
12 by adding things that made it a win-win on both
13 sides of the table.

14 BY MR. LARSON:

15 Q. A couple of follow-up questions, if I
16 could on that, Mr. Herring.

17 First of all, in the answers that you
18 were giving in the colloquy with the judges, a
19 number of times I think you referred to Pureplay
20 rates. I just want to be clear for the transcript,
21 is that -- you're referring to Pureplay rates or
22 per-play rates?

23 A. I was referring to the per-play rates
24 structure, not -- not the Pureplay rates that we
25 operate under.

1 JUDGE STRICKLER: You used the word
2 "pure" to distinguish it from the greater-of
3 formula? That's your use of the word "pure"?

4 THE WITNESS: No. I meant per play
5 meaning just a cost per play song, not -- no
6 reference to the -- to the settlement rates.

7 BY MR. LARSON:

8 Q. And another follow-up question, I think
9 you said that the per-play rates you initially
10 proposed would have resulted in a paying -- Pandora
11 paying a percentage of revenue somewhere in the
12 neighborhood of 50 percent; is that right?

13 A. I think at -- in the moment that we
14 proposed it, that would have been correct.

15 Q. And how would that -- according to your
16 projections of monetization and the like, how would
17 that percent of revenue change over time in those
18 per-play rates?

19 A. Well, I mean, that percent of revenue
20 would have dropped alongside our ability to drive
21 monetization. So in that same time over the period
22 of being front to late 2013 to now, our
23 monetization increased significantly where our
24 percent of revenue paid today is in the 40s. If we
25 were, you know, paying it at a -- at the .0011 cent

1 per play -- per-play rate, you know, that would be
2 probably closer to 40 percent.

3 Q. Okay. And where do your projections
4 show that rate going out over the next couple of
5 years? In other words, would it drop below 40
6 percent?

7 A. Yeah. Well, I mean, we intend to
8 continue to invest in our monetization levels, you
9 know. If it remained at .0011 for the -- you know,
10 for the next few years, we certainly would approach
11 25 percent of revenue in terms of label payments.

12 JUDGE STRICKLER: Now we're talking
13 about just Merlin?

14 THE WITNESS: If that -- if that was
15 the rate that we paid overall. Just Merlin.
16 Because Merlin is a little over 6 percent of our
17 spins, that rate by itself doesn't move. You know,
18 it's not enough to make a material difference to
19 the percentage of revenue. You know, maybe a
20 hundred basis points of 150 basis points, but not
21 5, 6 percentage points.

22 BY MR. LARSON:

23 Q. What role, if any, did the upcoming Web
24 IV proceeding play in Pandora's decision to seek
25 direct licenses?

1 A. Well, you know, any direct license we
2 do would be, you know, in a -- it would be
3 generally known by both sides, could potentially be
4 served as a benchmark in these processes. But our
5 initiative is to drive direct licensing as part of
6 a much broader strategy that involves a lot more
7 than just even domestic rates, but also our ability
8 to have non-DMCA compliance features and
9 functionality within -- within our service to
10 expanding international markets, you know, overseas
11 and other markets. There is no equivalent of these
12 statutory rates.

13 So if we want to expand outside of the
14 United States, which is a clearly stated goal of
15 the business, we would need to do direct deals and
16 work closely with label partners. So establishing
17 direct label relationships now and establishing
18 that partnership is important part of our long-term
19 strategy.

20 Q. Were you involved personally in the
21 negotiation of the Merlin license?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. And over what period of time was
24 that license or agreement negotiated?

25 A. I think the initial fall of 2013,

1 November or so of 2013, maybe December through the
2 signing of August 2014.

3 Q. Okay. And how would you generally
4 describe the nature of the negotiations, their
5 tenor?

6 A. So they were constructive. I think
7 they -- there was definitely a lot of back and
8 forth. You know, both sides had very specific
9 ideas about the -- what they were wanting to get
10 out of the agreement, and certainly on the Merlin
11 side they had lots of constituents to represent,
12 and, you know, I'm assuming there was a lot of back
13 and forth even within Merlin to understand -- make
14 sure we got to terms that everybody was comfortable
15 with.

16 JUDGE STRICKLER: Were you the lead
17 negotiator?

18 MR. LARSON: Chris Harrison was
19 probably more the lead on the day-to-day basis, but
20 in terms of determining what terms we would accept
21 and not accept I was the lead from Pandora.

22 JUDGE STRICKLER: And by terms, you
23 mean rates and terms?

24 THE WITNESS: Rates and all the terms
25 of the agreement, yes.

1 BY MR. LARSON:

2 Q. Was Pandora's ability to steer towards
3 Merlin a part of the negotiations?

4 A. Yes. It was central to -- central to
5 the negotiations. Once we moved into a discussion
6 off of a single unitary rate, our ability to steer
7 was the way Pandora accomplished its economic
8 objectives under the deal. It also was the
9 mechanism with which Merlin accomplished its
10 objectives under the deal.

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: You said a moment ago
12 in response to one of my questions that the
13 steering agreements preceded the Merlin
14 negotiations, correct?

15 THE WITNESS: The steering experiments
16 did, yes.

17 JUDGE STRICKLER: Steering experiments.
18 So, did you go into negotiations with
19 the goal of having steering in the contract?

20 THE WITNESS: We went into the
21 negotiations having -- knowing that if we were able
22 to get pricing that was below what the statutory
23 rates were or how we were paying everybody else, we
24 could use steering to bring our overall costs down.
25 So if we had gotten just a single unitary rate, we

1 would have then used steering to optimize our own
2 internal cost structure by steering to a
3 lower-priced offering. It became a term of the
4 deal only after they, you know, were looking for a
5 headline rate that was higher than the economic
6 rate.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: Correct me if I'm
8 wrong, you said that originally you proposed the
9 .0011, you meaning Pandora, correct?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: So when you proposed
12 the .0011, it was without any steering, whatsoever?

13 THE WITNESS: Well, it was with the
14 understanding that our pitch was is if you give us
15 a lower rate, we will spin you more.

16 JUDGE STRICKLER: Let's go back to the
17 number itself. When you proposed the .0011 --

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 JUDGE STRICKLER: -- did you say
20 everyone would introduce the steering term, as
21 well, or you just said -- in other words, you said,
22 here's the rate we propose and if Merlin had said
23 deal on that rate, it would have been no steering
24 in the agreement?

25 THE WITNESS: My recollection is the

1 pitch is this is the rate we propose. If you give
2 us this rate, we will spin you -- we will have an
3 economic incentive to play your music more so that
4 you will get a defined benefit from it. Meaning
5 greater exposure and promotion across Pandora's 80
6 million users.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: Did you indicate you
8 were going to put that in the contract, or you were
9 just saying it will give us an economic incentive
10 to do so; we won't make it an obligation to do so?

11 THE WITNESS: I have to admit I don't
12 remember what was in the original proposal, and
13 whether there was a commitment or not to it. It
14 quickly became a commitment.

15 JUDGE STRICKLER: I guess my more
16 important point that I'm trying to point out about
17 is when you went into the negotiations right from
18 the get-go, did you want to have a steering term in
19 there? Not whether you had the economic benefit of
20 steering, but whether you wanted an economic --
21 whether you wanted a contractual term to dictate
22 steering?

23 THE WITNESS: I honestly don't
24 remember. If in the first pitch -- within the
25 second round of term sheets, it was a defined term

1 that we were committing to. I don't remember,
2 honestly, if it was an actual in our initial term
3 sheet whether that was a commitment or not, I would
4 have to say.

5 JUDGE STRICKLER: Thank you.

6 BY MR. LARSON:

7 Q. Mr. Herring, shifting gears just
8 slightly, have you had a chance to review the
9 public version of Mr. Lexton's written rebuttal
10 testimony?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And who is Mr. Lexton?

13 A. He is in charge of business affairs and
14 the lead negotiator for Merlin.

15 Q. Now, Mr. Lexton testifies that one of
16 Merlin's objectives in its negotiations with
17 Pandora was, quote, "to try to obtain as much value
18 as it could for its members that Pandora otherwise
19 would not provide."

20 Is that consistent with your
21 understanding of what Merlin was seeking in the
22 negotiations?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. And have you had the chance to
25 review Mr. Van Arman written rebuttal testimony?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And Mr. Van Arman, has his company
3 opted into the Merlin deal?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And Mr. Van Arman testifies that
6 Merlin, quote, "saw the appeal of gaining a first
7 mover or direct license advantage, particularly in
8 an environment where independent record companies
9 are typically not afforded the first opportunity to
10 take advantage of such a term."

11 Is that consistent with your
12 understanding of what Merlin was seeking in the
13 negotiations?

14 A. Yes, it is.

15 Q. And just one more, do you understand
16 that Beggars Group has opted into the Merlin
17 agreement?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So Mr. Wheeler of Beggars Group claims
20 in his rebuttal testimony that the Merlin agreement
21 is not the result of free market negotiations; but,
22 rather, the result of an opportunity to experiment
23 with direct licensing under the statutory rates.

24 Do you agree with that statement?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Why not?

2 A. Nothing in this agreement feels like an
3 experiment. It was an agreement that involved not
4 some small portion of their music or one or two
5 artists, but their entire catalog; a significant
6 amount of time, a two-year time frame with two
7 additional years tapped on to that. It involved,
8 you know, significant economic terms and also
9 promotional benefits in terms of additional
10 exposure on our platform. You know, it felt like
11 an arm's length negotiation for -- and a real
12 agreement to Pandora and certainly to Merlin, at
13 least the best we could tell. It certainly didn't
14 feel like any kind of experiment.

15 BY MR. LARSON:

16 Q. Mr. Wheeler's quote and --

17 JUDGE FEDER: Excuse me, Counsel.

18 MR. LARSON: Yes.

19 JUDGE FEDER: You said two years taxed
20 on. Is that an option or has it been definitively
21 been extended to be an additional two years?

22 THE WITNESS: You know, there's -- each
23 year is an option. The first year is at Merlin's
24 option and the second year is at mutual option. We
25 both need to agree.

1 JUDGE FEDER: And I don't know if this
2 gets into restricted information, let me know if it
3 does, but how many of the indie labels have
4 actually opted into the Merlin agreement?

5 THE WITNESS: So there's about 15,000
6 labels of which about a third of which are
7 currently in our system. So some of these labels
8 have one artist. These are lots of very small --

9 JUDGE FEDER: So a third just gross
10 numbers or a third of repertoire?

11 THE WITNESS: No. A third in terms of
12 gross numbers. I think it's -- it's -- I don't
13 know the exact total size of those 15,000. My
14 guess is that it's, you know, well north of 50
15 percent of the repertoire. The largest labels are
16 the ones that have opted in.

17 JUDGE FEDER: Thank you.

18 BY MR. LARSON:

19 Q. Why don't we turn now to the second
20 slide of your --

21 JUDGE STRICKLER: Just before you do
22 that, since you talked about who opted in and who
23 did not opt in, the structure of the contract --
24 this may have come up previously and I don't recall
25 the answer.

1 Did a late Merlin label have to
2 affirmatively opt in or affirmatively have to opt
3 out?

4 THE WITNESS: So it's my understanding
5 that the answer is both situations existed. That
6 there is two different levels of memberships or
7 types of members within Merlin, and there's a
8 population of labels where Merlin can negotiate on
9 behalf of those labels and those labels have to opt
10 out if they don't want to accept the terms. And of
11 that population, it's our understanding that
12 greater than 90 percent of those labels did not opt
13 out. And that's the labels we talked -- you know,
14 we'll talk about. They're the larger labels that
15 we've already brought up are in that sort of core
16 group. Then there's a much larger group of smaller
17 labels that aren't automatically opted in but can
18 opt in voluntarily later if they choose to do so.

19 BY MR. LARSON:

20 Q. I just want to clarify one thing you
21 said in response to Judge Feder's question. First,
22 you mentioned 15,000 labels in your answer.

23 Are those 15,000 labels who are, in
24 fact, now covered by the Merlin license?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. And then I think you said a
2 third of those are in your system or something to
3 that effect?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you explain what you mean by that?

6 A. So if in -- a lot of this music isn't
7 already on Pandora. Pandora, because we're not an
8 on-demand service we don't have to have every song
9 that exists. You will hear other on-demand --
10 you'll hear on-demand services claim to have 30
11 million or 35 million songs. You know, we probably
12 have around 2 million, maybe something north of 2
13 million songs on our database that we use. We like
14 to say we have the 2 million songs that matter,
15 that people want to hear. It doesn't mean that
16 somebody doesn't want to hear song number 15
17 million. It's just economically we don't need that
18 to play a lean-back service.

19 In this context, we are ingesting a lot
20 of music that we hadn't previously ingested because
21 we're only focused on the 2 million. But as a --
22 as part of our work with Merlin, we've been
23 ingesting a lot of music we previously hadn't
24 ingested and some labels that we previously hadn't
25 worked with.

1 JUDGE STRICKLER: So 15,000 labels
2 opted into the contract or were automatically opted
3 in, as far as you know?

4 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding.

5 JUDGE STRICKLER: How many either opted
6 out or otherwise are not in?

7 THE WITNESS: I don't know the answer
8 to that question. I don't know how many is in the
9 greater universe. I think it's like 20,000, but I
10 don't --

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: You think 20,000 is
12 the total universe or --

13 THE WITNESS: Total universe, yes.

14 JUDGE STRICKLER: You think 15,000 out
15 of 20,000 opted in?

16 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding.

17 BY MR. LARSON:

18 Q. Let's turn to the next slide of your
19 deck, if we could, Mr. Herring. And because some
20 of this material is restricted, I'll ask you not to
21 state the numbers out loud, if you can, if you're
22 capable of doing it that way.

23 Does this slide reflect the main
24 financial terms to which the parties agreed?

25 A. It does.

1 Q. All right. And can you just walk us
2 through those basic terms?

3 A. So the royalty that we pay is a
4 greater-of structure between percent of revenue of
5 a prorated Merlin share -- prorated Merlin share of
6 our percent of revenue or a headline per-play rate
7 that has various discounts that can be applied to
8 it. One rate for advertising supported service and
9 another rate for subscription service.

10 Q. And what are those discounts, if you
11 would?

12 A. So we don't pay additional fees if we
13 steer member Merlin tracks up to about
14 12-and-a-half percent above their natural
15 performance rate. If we steer about that, we are
16 paying the sort of effective rate of 12-and-a-half
17 percent.

18 MR. KLAUS: Your Honor, I believe this
19 is -- I believe this is confidential information,
20 the percentages that are being discussed here in
21 terms of the spinning. I think that's been
22 designated as confidential and restricted by the
23 order.

24 MR. LARSON: Well -- so you're -- on
25 Merlin's behalf, you're making the objection?

1 MR. KLAUS: No, we're not -- we're
2 making -- this has been designated by restricted
3 and restricted by at least one party who's
4 submitted something to the proceeding. I'm not
5 sure that Pandora can -- they're not -- they're not
6 here to say anything. I'm not sure that Pandora
7 can -- it's appropriate for it to waive the
8 restricted information of someone else who's
9 designated as well.

10 MR. LARSON: We're happy to go to
11 restricted session. We thought we could do it at
12 this level and stay on the public record, but to be
13 safe we can go to restricted.

14 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Are you going to
15 have additional restricted questions?

16 MR. LARSON: The next couple of slides
17 I think will be.

18 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Ladies and
19 gentlemen, if you are in the hearing room and you
20 have not signed a nondisclosure certificate, please
21 wait outside a couple of minutes.

22 (THIS ENDS PUBLIC SESSION)

23 (RESTRICTED SESSION BOUND SEPARATELY)

24

25

Capital Reporting Company
Day 16 In Re: Determination of Royalty Rates (Public) 05-18-2015

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1 (THIS BEGINS PUBLIC SESSION)

2 STEPHAN D. MCBRIDE,

3 being first duly sworn, to tell the truth, the
4 whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified as
5 follows:

6 MR. MARKS: Good morning, Your Honors.
7 We've prepared some demonstratives that we'll be
8 using during Dr. McBride's direct examination. We
9 have them on the screen and I believe you also have
10 been given copies of printouts, so whatever you
11 find more convenient. May I proceed?

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Yes, please.

13 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR SOUNDEXCHANGE

14 BY MR. MARKS:

15 Q. Dr. McBride, will you please state your
16 full name for the record.

17 A. Stephan Douglas McBride.

18 Q. Where do you work?

19 A. Pandora.

20 Q. What is your job title?

21 A. Senior scientist, economics.

22 Q. How long have you worked for Pandora?

23 A. Just over a year.

24 Q. Would you please identify for the

25 Judges any undergraduate and graduate degrees that

1 you have.

2 A. Yes. I hold a Bachelor of Arts Honors
3 in economics from Simon Fraser University in
4 Canada. I hold a Master of Arts in economics from
5 Queen's University also in Canada. I hold a
6 Masters of Study in Law from Yale Law School and I
7 hold a doctor in economics from Stanford
8 University.

9 Q. And do you have any peer-reviewed
10 publications in scholarly journals?

11 A. I do.

12 Q. Before joining Pandora, what type of
13 work did you do?

14 A. I worked as a professional economist.

15 Q. Where did you do that?

16 A. For the six previous years, I worked at
17 Analysis Group, an economic consulting firm, where
18 -- for clients, I undertook numerous analyses,
19 economic analyses, where I designed and executed
20 and analyzed numerous analyses.

21 Q. What type of work do you do at Pandora
22 now?

23 A. Similar work. I am tasked with
24 designing, executing and analyzing analyses,
25 including experimental analyses.

1 Q. Dr. McBride, did you prepare written
2 direct testimony in connection with this
3 proceeding?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. I place before you in the white binder
6 on your desk, a document that has been marked for
7 identification as Pandora Exhibit 5020.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Do you recognize this document?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. What is it?

12 A. It's the testimony I submitted in this
13 matter.

14 Q. If you could please turn to the last
15 page before the appendices.

16 A. I'm there.

17 Q. Is that your signature?

18 A. It is.

19 Q. And are the attached figures, tables
20 and appendices materials that you referenced in
21 your written testimony?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. MARKS: I offer Pandora Exhibit
24 5020 into evidence.

25 MR. CHOUDHURY: No objection.

1 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: 5020 is admitted.
2 (Pandora Exhibit 5020 was admitted into
3 evidence.)

4 BY MR. MARKS:

5 Q. Dr. McBride, do you work with any
6 particular group or team at Pandora?

7 A. I do.

8 Q. What is that team called?

9 A. I work within the science team. It is
10 a group of now around 20 researchers who are tasked
11 with designing, executing and analyzing research,
12 primarily using controlled experiments to
13 understand the relationships and the causal
14 relationships between features and aspects of our
15 service.

16 Q. And your written direct testimony uses
17 the term gold standard in reference to Pandora's
18 experimental research.

19 Could you please explain what the gold
20 standard requires?

21 A. Yes. The gold standard requires three
22 things: Randomized, controlled and blind.

23 Q. And what does it mean for an experiment
24 to be randomized and why is that important to your
25 work?

1 A. An experiment is where the researcher
2 modifies the experience of users and -- with
3 randomized, exactly who gets that modified
4 experience, listening, a modified experience on
5 Pandora's service is randomized so we are able to
6 balance all of the unobservable distinctions
7 between people on our service so that half are in a
8 treatment group and half are not in a treatment
9 group.

10 Q. What does it mean for an experiment to
11 be controlled and why is that important to your
12 work?

13 A. Controlled means you randomize some
14 into treatment and some -- those not into
15 treatment, into controlled, and that allows you to
16 compare for randomly selected or assigned
17 individuals, the experience between those who have
18 a slightly modified experience entirely caused by
19 the researcher, and those in the control who have
20 no difference, and that allows you to compare
21 treatment to control, so that you have a
22 counterfactual estimate of what would otherwise
23 have occurred absent only the treatment introduced
24 by the researcher.

25 Q. What does it mean for an experiment to

1 be blind and why is that important to you?

2 A. The final prong, blind, means that any
3 individual who is in the experiment is unaware of
4 whether or not they are in a treatment group or
5 control. It's important because if individuals are
6 aware that they are in an experiment and know which
7 arm they are on, they can modify their behavior in
8 ways that would hamper the inference, the causal
9 inference that gold standard experimental research
10 allows.

11 Q. Are you familiar with Pandora's AB
12 framework for conducting experiments?

13 A. Yes, I am.

14 Q. What is the AB framework?

15 A. The AB framework is Pandora's internal
16 name for the architecture that modifies our base
17 code, that allows us to produce gold standard
18 research. The randomized controlled is blind by
19 randomly assigning some of our listeners to a
20 treatment group that have a modified listening
21 experiencing and the controlled group that allows
22 the counterfactual comparison for causal analysis.

23 Q. Have you conducted any sets of
24 experiments in connection with this proceeding?

25 A. Yes, I have.

1 Q. So could you just briefly identify what
2 sets of experiments that you conducted in
3 connection with this proceeding?

4 A. Yes. Two sets of experiments. What I
5 refer to as the steering experiments and also the
6 second set are what I refer to as the music sales
7 experiments.

8 Q. Let's start with the steering
9 experiments.

10 What questions were you attempting to
11 answer with that research?

12 A. That research tried to analyze the
13 effect of changing or modifying the spins of
14 listeners in treatment group based on the ownership
15 of those sound recordings.

16 Q. Did Professor Shapiro have a role in
17 designing the steering experiments?

18 A. Yes, he did.

19 Q. What was Professor Shapiro's role?

20 A. Professor Shapiro provided us detailed
21 instructions on the implementation and design of
22 this set of experiments.

23 Q. And what was your role?

24 A. My role was to take those instructions
25 and implement them in the AB framework and then

1 report back the requested results to Professor
2 Shapiro.

3 Q. Go to the next slide.

4 If you could please describe for the
5 judges in general terms what Dr. Shapiro asked you
6 to do.

7 A. For design, he asked that we use AB
8 framework so that we use Pandora's normal
9 experimental procedures. For the experiment and
10 manipulation, the researcher modified experience,
11 what we did was we changed the share of spins
12 available for an outcome that would be available to
13 the listeners in the treatment groups based on the
14 ownership of those sound recordings and then get
15 four specific requests in deflection for steering,
16 changing the spin share.

17 He asked for negative 30 percent,
18 negative 15 percent, plus 15 and plus 30, so four
19 treatment objectives for the spin share deflection.

20 JUDGE STRICKLER: Do you know how
21 Dr. Shapiro selected the four, negative -- minus
22 15, minus 30 and plus 15 and plus 30?

23 THE WITNESS: I don't, Your Honor.

24 JUDGE STRICKLER: I guess we will have
25 to ask him.

1 THE WITNESS: And then he applied -- he
2 requested at the directions -- Professor Shapiro
3 requested that those four treatments or steering
4 targets be applied to the three major ownership
5 groups, UMG, which -- Universal, Sony and then
6 Warner Music Group or Warner.

7 BY MR. MARKS:

8 Q. And what was the time frame of the
9 steering experiments?

10 A. They ran from June 4, 2014 through
11 September 3, 2014.

12 Q. And are additional details of your
13 methodology set forth in your written direct
14 testimony?

15 A. Yes, they are.

16 Q. Turn to the next slide.

17 Is this slide, Figure 1, from your
18 written direct testimony?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. What does this show?

21 A. This figure shows the difference
22 between the actual spin share in each of the 12
23 treatment groups versus control. So the previous
24 slide mentioned that Professor Shapiro directed us
25 to modify the spin share by plus 30, plus 15, which

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1 are the values -- I'm sorry, Your Honor, the left Y
2 axis label is not showing there but the left -- the
3 Y axis is the change in spins by music groups, so
4 the steering quantity in percentage terms or
5 percentage point terms, and then -- so the
6 30 percentage terms is plus 30 percent, plus 15
7 percent, minus 15 and minus 30.

8 What this shows is that our engineers
9 were able to modify the actual spin distribution of
10 listeners in those treatment groups to closely
11 approximate the requested target values that
12 Professor Shapiro provided.

13 Q. It looks like there is an aberrational
14 point in the middle of August in Figure 1.

15 What is the cause of that?

16 A. There was a brief malfunction in the AB
17 framework which prevented the spin shares closely
18 matching the actual requested targeted shares.

19 Q. And in your written direct testimony,
20 do you present the results both including that week
21 and then separately excluding that week?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. What is the metric that you used to
24 measure the effect on the listening experience?

25 A. Average hours per listeners.

1 Q. Why did you use that metric?

2 A. It is Pandora's standard measure of
3 listening behavior on the service for all business
4 -- for business purposes.

5 Q. And what do the results of the steering
6 experiments show?

7 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry,
8 I had a request from our client. If this is
9 public, we would just want to let the public come
10 in.

11 MR. MARKS: I apologize. I didn't
12 realize we were in closed session. The entire
13 direct examine will be public, I'm sorry.

14 JUDGE STRICKLER: Shall we start all
15 over again?

16 MR. POMERANTZ: No, we object to that.

17 THE WITNESS: This particular table is
18 restricted in my written direct testimony.

19 MR. MARKS: That's fine. It's fine to
20 disclose. They can come in.

21 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: It's noon. We're
22 going to take our noon break. Thank you.

23 You provided us a convenient breaking
24 point. We will drop back ten.

25 (A short recess was taken.)

1 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Please be seated.

2 Mr. Marks, shall we have another run at
3 it?

4 MR. MARKS: Please, Your Honor.

5 And I would just want to note for the
6 record -- I realize that we were in closed session
7 for the portion of Dr. McBride's testimony that was
8 conducted before lunch. That does not need to be
9 restricted.

10 And so for purposes of the final
11 transcript, that can be part of the public record.

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Great. Thank
13 you.

14 And for those of you who missed it, too
15 bad.

16 Go ahead, Mr. Marks.

17 BY MR. MARKS:

18 Q. Dr. McBride, you'll recall that right
19 before the break we were talking about the steering
20 experiments and just about to discuss what the
21 results of the steering experiments were.

22 Do you recall that?

23 A. There was quite a cliffhanger. Yes.

24 So behind the judges are the primary
25 findings. The primary -- the first primary finding

1 was that --

2 Q. Let me just stop you before you get
3 into it.

4 Is this slide a simplified version of
5 Table 1 from your written direct testimony?

6 A. That's correct. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And does this report the results
8 of the steering experiments?

9 A. Yes, it does.

10 Q. And what did you fund?

11 A. We found that we were able to steer
12 either plus or minus 15 percent without
13 statistically significant impact on listening. No
14 listener effect.

15 We found in two instances a negative 30
16 percent Universal and a plus 30 for Sony. Small --
17 small average effect over the period on listening
18 retention.

19 Q. And are you aware that Dr. Rubinfeld
20 critiques certain aspects of your written direct
21 testimony in his written rebuttal testimony?

22 A. I am aware of that.

23 Q. And what is your response to his
24 contention that the loss of listenership tends to
25 grow as the steering experiments continue and his

1 suggestion that the average effects you observed
2 may understate the loss of listenership over a
3 longer period?

4 A. So this exhibit here is Professor
5 Rubinfeld's own Exhibit 13-A. I have added the
6 dotted line. And these represent data that I
7 included in my written direct testimony. He has
8 added the black simple average.

9 And my interpretation of all of these
10 data, and from my experience in reviewing these
11 data, is that there is no trend or any evidence of
12 declining listenership over the period of the
13 experiment after the midpoint. So I would -- I
14 would disagree with that point.

15 And that -- so logically I have
16 additional problems with this. First, he presents
17 a simple average, which is an average of an
18 average, which is not an appropriate method when
19 you have different portions of the sample in each
20 of the groups.

21 And then, finally, he doesn't disclose
22 or acknowledge on this exhibit that he's combining
23 numerous examples that were insignificant
24 statistically with significant results and not
25 reporting that.

1 Q. And do you think that's a correct
2 methodological approach?

3 A. I find it irregular.

4 Q. All right. So turning back to the sets
5 of experiments that you mentioned, there's another
6 set of experiments that you conducted; is that
7 right?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And what were the music sales
10 experiments designed to test?

11 A. The purpose of the music sales
12 experiments was to test Pandora's causal impact on
13 whether Pandora promotes music sales or substitutes
14 for music sales on net.

15 Q. And if you could -- how did you go
16 about answering that question?

17 A. Yes. So in that experiment, the
18 manipulation imposed by the researcher, myself and
19 my colleagues, was to disable, prevent from playing
20 on Pandora, particular music.

21 We had two groups of experiments. We
22 had new music, which was music that had never
23 played on Pandora. So when it was about to start
24 playing for all of our listeners, we intercepted it
25 in the engineering code and randomized where it was

1 available.

2 We had a second set of experiments,
3 which I refer to as the catalog music sales
4 experiments. And these included music that had
5 been long available on Pandora and numerous other
6 places, in some case years and decades.

7 And so in that experiment, again, we
8 took that music and randomly prevented our -- some
9 of our listeners in the treatment group not to be
10 able to access that music.

11 So then we have a separation between
12 the treated group -- as we defined it, for
13 simplicity -- it doesn't change the results, but we
14 define treatment as having the music on Pandora and
15 the control is not having the music on Pandora.

16 So we had a causal -- we had a
17 separation produced by this experimental
18 manipulation.

19 Q. And why did you distinguish between new
20 releases or new music and catalog music?

21 A. We thought there were distinctions in
22 expected sales of new music versus catalog and also
23 potential differences in the general availability,
24 marketing of new music versus catalog.

25 Q. How does Pandora obtain geographic

1 information about the location of its listeners?

2 A. Yes. Upon registration, our U.S.

3 listeners are required to provide us a ZIP code.

4 And that has been case for at least seven years.

5 Those listeners, upon discretion, sometimes at our

6 prompt, are encouraged to update their ZIP code as

7 well.

8 Q. And do, in fact, Pandora listeners

9 update their ZIP codes from time to time?

10 A. Yes, they do.

11 Q. Why did you perform the analysis by

12 region?

13 A. Yes. So with the steering experiments,

14 we had individual level outcome. We had hours of

15 listening for every listener on Pandora.

16 With the music sales experiment, the

17 equivalent would be we would need individual

18 listeners' purchase data. And at Pandora we -- we

19 aren't -- we do not have access to individual

20 listener purchase data.

21 As a consequence, we had to go find a

22 source that had the most granular music sales data

23 that we could find.

24 Q. And where did Pandora obtain the weekly

25 sales data that it used?

1 A. We used Nielsen SoundScan weekly data.

2 Q. Why did you use Nielsen SoundScan?

3 A. We understood in discussion that this
4 was perceived to be the best, most complete,
5 comprehensive data available at a granular level of
6 music sales for physical albums and digital
7 downloads in the United States.

8 Q. And did the Nielsen data that you used
9 track both physical CD sales and digital downloads?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And what is the geographical unit by
12 which Nielsen tracks sales?

13 A. The most granular region that Nielsen
14 will make their data available on music purchases
15 is called a designated market area, which in my --
16 which is also sometimes referred to as a DMA.
17 There are -- in our study, we had 228 of these.

18 Q. And were the experiments done at the
19 level of individual tracks, albums or some
20 combination?

21 A. For the new music experiments, we
22 manipulated the availability of an album. So all
23 tracks on an album were either available to a
24 listener to play at our normal Pandora algorithm or
25 unavailable, and none of the tracks on that album

1 would be available.

2 For catalog music sales experiment, we
3 used songs. We found that albums of catalog music,
4 because of golden his, greatest his, and remastered
5 versions, sales of catalog music were too
6 fragmented across albums to be able to analyze at
7 the album level.

8 Q. Does your written direct testimony
9 describe in greater detail how you determined which
10 new music and which catalog music to turn off in
11 your experiment?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 Q. Let me --

14 A. Sorry to --

15 Q. There we go.

16 If you could just explain what this
17 slide reflects.

18 A. Yes. This is a map of the United
19 States. All of the internal boundaries represent
20 the boundaries of Nielsen DMAs -- sorry --
21 designated market areas. So all of those internal
22 boundaries are each of the 228 designated market
23 areas.

24 The dark color -- I'm sorry.

25 The dark color and light color were

1 randomized. This is the actual availability of one
2 of the experiments included in our research. The
3 dark green are the randomly assigned areas where
4 the music would be available for one particular
5 experiment. And all of the light green areas were
6 the randomly assigned areas where the music was not
7 available.

8 So at a high level, we are comparing
9 the sales in the areas that were randomly
10 available -- sorry -- where the music was randomly
11 available, the total sales in the green areas,
12 compared to the sales in the light green areas.

13 And notably, our experimental design
14 had separate randomization for all of our
15 experiments. In outcome we had over 1,200 of these
16 music availability experiments to explore our
17 causal impact on music sales.

18 And so, for any of the areas that are
19 dark green here, on average they would be light
20 green half the time and dark green so that each of
21 these were randomized so that we capture and
22 control for any regional differences in, for
23 example, genre preference.

24 Q. And is there -- do you have any reason
25 to believe that the starting week that you used for

1 the music sales experiments was exceptional in some
2 way?

3 A. I have no reason for that, no.

4 Q. And do you have any reason to believe
5 that the ending week was exceptional in some way?

6 A. No. No, I don't. I would also
7 actually note that, because we ran so many
8 experiments, we also had staggered start periods
9 and staggered end periods so that they weren't
10 entirely overlapping.

11 So that also was able to address any
12 concerns that could be had regarding exceptional
13 natures, the periods that we ran the experiments.

14 Q. And are the additional details of your
15 methodology for the music sales experiments set
16 forth in your written direct testimony?

17 A. Yes, they are.

18 Q. Did the music sales experiments reflect
19 an average promotional effect?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And is that what's shown on this slide?

22 A. This slide here -- I apologize. It
23 says Table 4. This is actually Table 3 from my
24 written direct testimony.

25 And what this shows is that, on

1 average, music being available on Pandora, Pandora
2 causes that music -- or sales of that music to rise
3 by 2.3 percent on average for new music. And
4 because the music is available on Pandora, we cause
5 catalog music sales on average to be 2.66 percent
6 higher.

7 The confidence interval, the values in
8 the second column, show the range where the -- the
9 range by which we can be very confident the true
10 causal estimate of how much Pandora in this case
11 promotes music sales-wise. Both of these are
12 highly statistically significant.

13 Q. And did you also calculate the results
14 separately by label type?

15 A. Yes, we did. This figure here presents
16 a simplified version of Table 4 in my written
17 direct testimony.

18 Starting with the first column -- oh, I
19 apologize, Your Honors. The -- some of the letters
20 are cut off. It says "New Music" -- it says "New
21 Music" in the top table.

22 So we find for new music -- when
23 looking by the ownership of the music that was
24 included in the experiments, we found that Pandora
25 causes music sales for music released on major

1 labels to rise by a higher amount 2.82 percent, a
2 very highly significant figure.

3 You'll note that I did not bold the
4 estimate -- the positive estimate of 0.62 for new
5 music on other labels. One of the -- that estimate
6 wasn't statistically significant.

7 For catalog music sales, when you
8 separate by the ownership of the music, we again
9 see extremely -- or positive promotional estimates
10 that Pandora causes increase in these sales at very
11 high levels of statistical significance.

12 So we are confident that these are
13 promotional effects.

14 Q. Did you find any evidence that the
15 extent of exposure on Pandora for a given sound
16 recording impacts the size of the promotional
17 effect?

18 A. Yes, we did find that.

19 And this next figure will need
20 explanation. Broadly it's Figure 3(a) in my
21 written direct testimony. It includes three
22 panels.

23 Focusing first on the left panel, these
24 are estimated promotional effects for new music for
25 different subsets of the experiments.

1 For new music we had 814 different
2 music albums that we were able to manipulate the
3 availability and then were able to assess the
4 sales.

5 And what these broadly show is that, as
6 you look at areas -- or for experiments by which
7 Pandora represents more exposure, then we see a
8 higher promotional effect.

9 And so the scale along the X axis is
10 it's a threshold that says, you know, there are at
11 least one spin per sale.

12 At a high level, when you think about
13 it, if a particular song has 10,000 spins on
14 Pandora, that could be a lot or a little exposure.

15 So if we find that that particular
16 sound recording had two sales, 10,000 spins on
17 Pandora might represent substantial exposure.

18 Conversely, if that album or sound
19 recording had 50,000 sales, then I would see that
20 10,000 spins on Pandora is not substantial
21 exposure.

22 The way we thought about how much does
23 Pandora represent share of exposure is by the ratio
24 on the bottom, which is the ratio of spins on
25 Pandora for the music divided by sales that we

1 observed from Nielsen. So one measure of relative
2 exposure.

3 And what we find is, as Pandora
4 represents more and more relative exposure, we see
5 higher promotional effects. So in the right panel,
6 you'll note that the first couple estimates,
7 because they're gray and they cover -- across the
8 zero dash line, it means they're not statistically
9 significant.

10 But when you look at the large share of
11 experiments that were new music released on other
12 labels, we actually observed extremely strong,
13 highly statistically significant promotional
14 effect.

15 And the last value on your right, left,
16 depending upon how you see it, we estimate a 25
17 percent net promotional effect of Pandora for the
18 subset of experiments where Pandora represents 200
19 spins per one sale.

20 Q. And this slide is the promotional
21 impact by exposure for new music.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you also have a figure of
24 promotional impact by exposure for catalog music?

25 A. Yes, we did. This figure that's now

1 shown as Figure 3(b) from my written direct
2 testimony. And the same pattern holds.

3 As you look at the subset of
4 experiments where Pandora represented a larger and
5 larger share of the exposure, how much the
6 listeners in that region were able to access or
7 experience that music, Pandora continuously, we
8 estimate, is a higher promotional effect on the
9 sales of that same music.

10 Q. Are you aware that Dr. Blackburn has
11 critiqued your music sales experiments?

12 A. Yes, I am.

13 Q. Are you aware that Dr. Blackburn has
14 criticized you for not using data related to the
15 buy button on Pandora's Website to measure
16 promotional impact?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How do you respond to that criticism?

19 A. My first response is it's observational
20 insight. It's correlation; it's not causation.
21 All of the results that I've presented today are
22 causal estimates. They come from an experiment.
23 Thinking about the buy button observational,
24 that -- that's simply correlation.

25 The second point is it presumes that

1 the only way a radio services would be able to
2 promote music sales is through a direct channel of
3 this button. I find that unconvincing, in part
4 because terrestrial radio does not have a buy
5 button, and my general sense is that the industry
6 accepts that terrestrial radio is promotional even
7 absent any form of direct channel for purchase.

8 And then finally, I will note that the
9 availability of the data for use of the buy button
10 on our service is not broadly available, in part
11 of -- because of privacy and security reasons for
12 our service and our listeners.

13 Q. Did Dr. Blackburn assume that the buy
14 button data would be more available to you than
15 they are?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. And are you aware that Dr. Blackburn
18 has criticized you for excluding experiments with
19 zero sales from your analysis?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Does that criticism affect in any way
22 your catalog music sales experiments?

23 A. No. All of the results that are
24 currently on the image from Figure 3(b) for the
25 catalog music sales experiments, none of those are

1 in any way affected by this criticism because all
2 of the music included in the catalog music sales
3 had sales. So that argument is simply not
4 applicable to all of these promotional estimates.

5 Q. What other responses do you have to the
6 criticism by Dr. Blackburn that you should not have
7 excluded experiments with zero sales analysis?

8 A. Most notably, he criticized this
9 research for excluding experiments for which the
10 vast majority have no data available. So --

11 Q. Does that mean there are no sales?

12 A. We don't know. No one is able to know
13 whether or not this music had sales. For the vast
14 majority of what he's criticizing, neither he nor I
15 have any access to data to say whether or not there
16 were sales and Pandora promoted them or there were
17 sales and Pandora suppressed them. It's simply
18 impossible as a researcher to know.

19 An additional reason that I would note
20 why I think it's a misplaced criticism is the
21 strong promotional estimates that we find for new
22 music where there are some experiments with zero
23 sales depends on 28.7 million units of sales. And
24 Professor -- or Dr. Blackburn is focusing on a
25 couple of cases where some of them had zero.

1 Even if they had some units of sales
2 and, for argument, if Pandora substituted for all
3 of them, it would not materially affect net
4 promotional effects that I show in my report.

5 Q. For some of the experiments that
6 Dr. Blackburn criticizes you for excluding, were
7 there spins on Pandora?

8 A. Right. Another thing that he -- there
9 were not. For seven of the experiments that he
10 criticizes us for excluding, the music that was
11 included in the experiments never played on our
12 service.

13 Of course we could not be promotional
14 for music that we did not use. So accordingly,
15 reasonably as researchers, we did not include that
16 in our analysis.

17 Q. Are you aware that Dr. Blackburn has
18 criticized your experiments because of potential
19 inaccuracies in the data Pandora maintains about
20 the geographic location of its listeners?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. How do you respond to that criticism?

23 A. It makes a profound error regarding
24 normal interpretation of experimental methods.

25 Conceptually we're comparing the

1 outcomes for the region that's treated to the
2 outcomes that the regions are controlled.

3 If you accept, as Professor Blackburn
4 suggests, that there is some inaccuracies in our
5 ZIP code data, what we're actually estimating the
6 promotional effect on is a smaller spread between
7 the treated group and the control.

8 So if anything, if you were to accept
9 his claim, the true promotional effect that I -- is
10 actually higher, is larger than I report in my
11 estimate. It's the very common finding in
12 experimental methods. It's called dilution or
13 watering down of a treatment effect.

14 And so the primary implication is in no
15 way to affect the validity of the results but
16 instead actually to suggest helpfully that the
17 promotional effect that we find is, in fact, higher
18 than number that I report in my testimony.

19 Q. And are you aware that Dr. Blackburn
20 has singled out the 90210 area code -- excuse me --
21 ZIP code as having particular inaccuracies as a
22 result of Pandora users self-reporting that they
23 live in Beverly Hills, California?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How do you respond to Dr. Blackburn's

1 criticism on the 90210 Zip code point?

2 A. I have several thoughts, I think. The
3 first is this is a single region out of 228. And
4 so it is unlikely to materially affect the results.

5 Second, and I think importantly, the
6 experimental design of our research randomizes each
7 region, sometimes to treatment, to sometimes
8 control. So contrary to any assumption in this
9 material things, sometimes it could be driving
10 sales; sometimes it could not. It's simply not --
11 it's balanced because of the experimental design.

12 And then finally, to the previous
13 point, this is a -- this could be an example of
14 inaccuracies which suggest a spreading, the
15 difference between treatment and control, so that,
16 if you were to accept his argument, in fact, the
17 true promotional effect would be higher than I
18 report in my testimony.

19 MR. MARKS: No further questions, Your
20 Honor.

21 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR SOUNDEXCHANGE

22 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

23 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. McBride. Good to
24 see you again.

25 A. Thank you. Likewise.

1 Q. As you know, I represent SoundExchange.

2 A. Yes. I know that.

3 Q. So first of all, just by way of
4 background, the two studies you report in your
5 testimony, you've been working on them since your
6 first day at Pandora, correct?

7 A. Very close. One I started -- on my
8 first day I started thinking about. The other one,
9 my first week.

10 Q. And when you interviewed for your
11 position at Pandora, you interviewed with Mr.
12 Harrison, right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. And he's not in the science department
15 of Pandora, right?

16 A. He is not.

17 Q. He is in-house counsel at Pandora,
18 right?

19 A. He is that. He is also vice president
20 of business affairs.

21 Q. And looking back to your first day,
22 after you completed your human resource paperwork,
23 what was the first thing you did at Pandora?

24 A. After that I met with my boss for an
25 orientation meeting.

1 Q. Right.

2 And that's Mr. Bieschke?

3 A. Yes, it is.

4 Q. And you discussed with him there the
5 music sales experiments, correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And between the time you were hired by
8 Pandora and the time you submitted your written
9 direct testimony, is it correct that the only
10 studies or experiments you worked on were the two
11 sets of experiments in your testimony plus a study
12 on how ad load affects listener retention?

13 A. That's not true.

14 Q. Okay. What was the other study or
15 experiment?

16 A. The other two were ad quality and the
17 effect of ad repetition on listening patterns. I
18 did not work on the ad load experiment.

19 Q. And all of those were at the direction
20 of counsel, correct?

21 A. That's not correct.

22 Q. Which wasn't?

23 A. The two that I added were not at the
24 direction of counsel.

25 Q. Okay. And at the time you were deposed

1 though, all of the studies or experiments you had
2 executed since coming to Pandora were at the
3 direction of counsel, correct?

4 A. Sir, could you ask the question again?

5 Q. Sure.

6 At the time you were deposed --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And as you might imagine, I'm harkening
9 back to our deposition.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. At the time you were deposed, all of
12 the studies or experiments you had executed since
13 coming to Pandora were at the direction of counsel,
14 correct?

15 A. I don't think exactly correct. The
16 only experiments I had run as of our deposition
17 were at the direction of counsel.

18 Q. And that was counsel for this
19 litigation, right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. At the time I took your deposition,
22 it's true that you had no research to report that
23 was not at the direction of counsel, correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 JUDGE STRICKLER: Just so it's clear,

1 when you say you had no research to report that
2 wasn't at the direction of counsel, in terms of
3 topic or in terms of results?

4 THE WITNESS: In terms of results. So
5 the two studies that I reminded counsel about were
6 exploratory studies. And when I became more
7 involved in executing these experiments, those were
8 performed and finished by colleagues on the science
9 team.

10 JUDGE STRICKLER: Was counsel involved
11 in managing the results?

12 THE WITNESS: No.

13 JUDGE STRICKLER: That was my question.

14 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honor.

15 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

16 Q. I'd like to begin by discussing the
17 music sales experiments.

18 Your assignment there was to test
19 whether performances of sound recordings on Pandora
20 have a positive or negative impact on sales of the
21 sound recordings, correct?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And you never worked in the music
24 industry, right?

25 A. I have not.

1 Q. And when you worked at Analysis Group,
2 none of your projects there involved the music
3 industry, correct?

4 A. That's my recollection, yes.

5 Q. You never published an academic paper
6 on the music industry, correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. You never published an analysis of
9 promotion or substitution, right?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And besides this experiment, you've
12 never studied the reason that consumers purchase
13 music, correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. And besides this experiment, you've not
16 studied the reasons for increases or decreases in
17 sales across the music industry, right?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And that includes regional variations,
20 correct?

21 A. It would, yes.

22 Q. And that includes seasonal variations,
23 too, right?

24 A. I agree.

25 Q. Okay. So before we get into the

1 experiments themselves, I just want to understand
2 the scope of the testimony you're presenting to the
3 judges.

4 So your testimony isn't studying
5 whether Pandora is a substitute or promotional for
6 revenue from interactive streaming services, right?

7 A. I agree.

8 Q. And you agree that your experiments
9 don't say anything about how promotion interactive
10 services are, right?

11 A. I agree with that.

12 Q. Or terrestrial radio?

13 A. I agree. And my studies weren't
14 designed to test any of those.

15 Q. Or simulcasters?

16 A. I agree.

17 Q. Or any other Webcasters besides
18 Pandora, correct?

19 A. I agree.

20 Q. And you'd also agree that your
21 experiments don't say anything about how
22 promotional Pandora is as compared to an
23 interactive service, right?

24 A. Studies don't test that. I agree.

25 Q. Or as compared to terrestrial radio,

1 right?

2 A. I agree with that.

3 Q. Or as compared to simulcasters?

4 A. I agree.

5 Q. Or as compared to any other Webcaster,

6 right?

7 A. I agree.

8 Q. And you'd also agree that your
9 experiments don't say anything about whether
10 Pandora promotes subscription revenue to any other
11 digital service, right?

12 A. We didn't have those data. So
13 certainly we weren't able the study that, no.

14 Q. Or to concert revenue to the music
15 industry, correct?

16 A. I'm working on it.

17 Q. But that's not in your testimony.

18 A. It is not.

19 Q. And, in fact, your experiments don't
20 say anything about any revenue source besides sales
21 of CDs and downloads, right?

22 A. And the direct royalties that we pay
23 for the music that we're playing in the
24 experiments, yes.

25 Q. Sure.

1 So you tested the royalties in your
2 experiments?

3 A. The royalties certainly went down when
4 we turned the music off.

5 Q. I see.

6 So that's what you mean when you say
7 you tested the royalties?

8 A. I didn't mean to suggest I tested the
9 royalties.

10 Q. Okay. Now, you acknowledge in Footnote
11 27 of your testimony that to draw a broader
12 interpretation of Pandora's effect on aggregate
13 sales -- oh, and, please, by all means, take a
14 look. This is on Page 17.

15 A. I'm good.

16 Q. Okay. So you suggest that to draw a
17 broader interpretation of Pandora's effect on
18 aggregate sales of manipulated music, you would
19 need to assume that sales of a specific sound
20 recording are not affected by manipulation of other
21 music in the experiment, correct?

22 A. That is what it says, yes.

23 Q. And you did nothing to investigate
24 whether that assumption was correct, right?

25 A. I did not.

1 Q. Okay. And, in fact -- well, did anyone
2 -- did counsel tell you that you couldn't
3 investigate that assumption?

4 A. They did not.

5 Q. Okay. So you were free to, correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But you chose not to.

8 A. I don't know if it's feasible, but I --
9 I did not do that.

10 Q. And that would mean that your
11 experiment doesn't tell us anything about whether
12 Pandora increases total music sales for the
13 industry, right?

14 A. I don't fully agree with that
15 interpretation. The study results provide insights
16 on that broader interpretation. This is a
17 necessary assumption for the exact numbers to
18 apply.

19 Q. Well, Dr. McBride, this isn't the first
20 time you've been asked that question, is it?

21 A. It's not.

22 Q. Okay. So you, in fact, provided
23 deposition testimony in the BMI rate setting
24 proceeding, correct?

25 A. I did.

1 Q. And you -- in that proceeding, we're
2 talking about these same music sales experiments,
3 correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. So I'd ask you to turn to Tab 3. If
6 you can turn to Page 14 of that document.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: That'd big Page 14?

8 MR. CHOUDHURY: It'd be big Page 14.

9 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

10 Q. If you could look at the --

11 MR. MARKS: I just want the record to
12 be clear. Counsel identified -- he referred to
13 deposition testimony. Tab 3 is not deposition
14 testimony.

15 MR. CHOUDHURY: Thank you for that
16 correction.

17 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

18 Q. In fact, this is your trial testimony
19 from the BMI hearing; isn't that correct?

20 A. You'll have to give my a second. Yes.
21 It appears to be.

22 Q. Okay. So if you look at the -- on
23 page -- big Page 14, you see Page 1922, correct?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And you see -- you're -- and this is --

1 this is your testimony, correct?

2 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Are you asking
3 this --

4 MR. CHOUDHURY: I'm just using it
5 for --

6 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: To refresh
7 recollection?

8 MR. CHOUDHURY: -- impeachment and to
9 refresh his recollection.

10 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Go ahead.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes. That is my
12 testimony.

13 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I'm sorry. Just
14 so the record is clear, this is testimony that was
15 given in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
16 District of New York on March 4, 2015, before the
17 Honorable Louis Stanton.

18 MR. CHOUDHURY: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

20 Q. So if you could look at Line 11. The
21 question you're asked is: "But you would agree
22 that your experiment doesn't say anything about
23 whether Pandora increases total music sales,
24 right?"

25 Your answer there is: "The results are

1 specific to the music that is included in the
2 experiments, which I agree is not all of the music
3 that is available on Pandora."

4 And then the question is: "Right. If
5 Pandora didn't exist, you're not testifying that
6 your music sales say anything about whether there
7 would be more music sales or less music sales in
8 the absence of Pandora, right?"

9 And you answer: "It's somewhere in
10 between. It provides insights on that, but it does
11 not directly address the question."

12 A. I said --

13 Q. Is that correct?

14 A. -- exactly that. I would also direct
15 you to Line 1, which says: "That is certainly true
16 prior to the period of experimentation. But the
17 promotional effect for the music study does provide
18 insight on the general promotional effect."

19 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Dr. McBride, I'm
20 going to ask you to read that again at normal
21 speed.

22 THE WITNESS: I apologize. So I was
23 reading you Line 1 from Page 1922, which says,
24 answer to a question: "That is certainly true
25 prior to the period of experimentation. But the

1 promotional effect for the music study does provide
2 insight on the general promotional effect."

3 I would say that directly pertains to
4 your interpretation of my Footnote 27.

5 JUDGE STRICKLER: That begs the
6 question: What insights?

7 THE WITNESS: Right. So I would assert
8 that it's the only -- it is, to my knowledge, the
9 only gold standard evidence of promotional or
10 substitutional effect of radio. And it suggests
11 that, because music is on Pandora, not correlation
12 but cause, Pandora causes sales to go up.

13 JUDGE STRICKLER: Sales of a specific
14 song that's been manipulated.

15 THE WITNESS: That's true.

16 The impact of the response from the
17 exposure effect, where I show figures 3(a) and
18 3(b), say increased exposure on Pandora causes or
19 is associated with higher promotional effect, which
20 my --

21 JUDGE STRICKLER: With regard to that
22 specific song.

23 THE WITNESS: True. But because it's
24 inducing higher sales of that song, the core issue
25 is where are those sales coming from? And it is

1 unknown broadly. But some of those, because of the
2 response from the increased exposure effect, it
3 suggests that it does induce pure promotional
4 effect of increased sales overall.

5 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

6 Q. Now, the answer you just gave, that is
7 specific to the song that is being manipulated,
8 correct?

9 A. Is it not.

10 Q. In fact, that's what your Footnote 27
11 assumption is about, right?

12 That if we wanted to know Pandora's
13 effect on aggregate sales of manipulated music, we
14 need to assume that the sales of a specific sound
15 recording are not affected by the manipulation of
16 other music in the experiments, correct?

17 A. That's not correct.

18 For -- what Footnote 27 says is, for
19 the exact value reported in my study derived from
20 admittedly a sample of it -- of music, for that
21 exact value to be the aggregate promotional value
22 does require this assumption.

23 I'm not asserting that it is the true
24 promotional effect overall. I am noting that it
25 provides insights on the interpretation of is

1 Pandora promotional in general on music sales.

2 JUDGE STRICKLER: So you don't know
3 whether the net promotional effect could be lower
4 because it might just -- the sales of the
5 manipulated song may be offset to some extent by
6 fewer sales of a nonmanipulated song.

7 THE WITNESS: I agree.

8 JUDGE STRICKLER: And is it -- your
9 study doesn't address whether or not the reduction
10 in sales in the nonmanipulated song might swamp the
11 promotional effect on -- of the manipulated song.

12 THE WITNESS: I agree, Your Honor. It
13 doesn't directly test that.

14 My interpretation of the dose response
15 effect, the increased exposure of music on Pandora
16 being associated with higher promotional effect.
17 So if you're producing more exposure on this one
18 but less on this, that does produce a difference in
19 exposure which would be suggestive of an overall
20 effect on informing music sales.

21 Because, if you're giving this
22 particular song ten more spins, but you're giving
23 one extra spin to ten other songs, there's a
24 difference in quantity of exposure. And my
25 interpretation is that that provides insights on

1 the effect broadly.

2 But -- so my meaning in Footnote 27 is
3 simply, for the exact values I report to be Pandora
4 causes a broader music effect of the exact figures,
5 requires this assumption. And I did not test that
6 assumption. I think it provides insight.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: Thank you.

8 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

9 Q. And just to be clear, your insights
10 there, you're not providing a statistically
11 significant value to the panel, right, on those
12 insights?

13 A. It's not a test. It's not a
14 statistical test. It's an interpretation.

15 Q. And you're not, in fact, providing any
16 numerical value on the net promotional effect;
17 you're saying that this is your interpretation from
18 what you're seeing, correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Now, this experiment, I think we talked
21 about in your direct examination, happened at the
22 regional level.

23 You picked what we call DMAs, and you
24 chose on a either specific song or specific album
25 level two stops spinning Pandora on them, correct?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And then you compared the sales for
3 where DMAs were being -- where the song was being
4 spun to where it wasn't, right?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. And that's because -- and you didn't
7 have listener level data, right?

8 A. We wanted it, but we don't have it.

9 Q. You don't have it, so you couldn't use
10 it.

11 A. Could not use it.

12 Q. Right.

13 So consumers inside a DMA who are not
14 subscribers to Pandora -- I mean let's say that I
15 am not a Pandora subscriber. I'm in one of your
16 DMAs. I buy music.

17 Are my purchases of music still
18 counted?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And consumers who are Pandora
21 users but didn't use Pandora during the weeks in
22 which your experiments were conducted, were their
23 purchases counted as well?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And consumers who are Pandora

1 users would have never found the songs, either
2 because they had -- just have different tastes,
3 they would have never used the songs manipulated.

4 Were their purchases counted?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And it is true, right, that,
7 with respect to, for example, consumers who are not
8 Pandora users, you couldn't control which of them
9 received the treatment versus the control in terms
10 of the manipulation of the sound recording, right?

11 A. False.

12 Q. But you have no ability to, in fact,
13 control whether someone hears a song on Pandora or
14 not if they're not actually a Pandora user.

15 A. I think that's a wrong interpretation.
16 So I agree --

17 Q. Let's start with my question.

18 Do you have the ability to control a
19 user who is not a Pandora user with respect to
20 whether they're going to hear the sound recording
21 you're manipulating or not?

22 A. They have the exact same experience as
23 everyone in our control.

24 Q. Which is to say that they're not on
25 Pandora at all.

1 A. So they're not exposed to the music.

2 Q. But some of them are inside your
3 treatment DMAs, correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. And some of them are inside your
6 control DMAs, correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And their purchases are being counted
9 toward the sales you call the first spin
10 performance of Pandora, correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, let's talk about consumers who
13 were Pandora users.

14 A. Yes.

15 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Before we go
16 there, Dr. McBride, was there any attempt to
17 compare the sound recordings that Pandora was
18 leaving in --

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: -- or -- that's
21 the scientific term -- that Pandora was spinning
22 with contemporaneous activity on either other
23 streaming services or terrestrial radio?

24 For instance, if Taylor Perry or Katy
25 Swift or any of those were hot on terrestrial radio

1 at the same time that Pandora was using that
2 particular sound recording, you wouldn't know what
3 Pandora's effect was, correct?

4 THE WITNESS: We would. So the direct
5 answer to your question is no, we didn't directly
6 control for that. But it's included in the
7 experimental design.

8 So because we're randomizing, we're
9 accounting for some of those differences in --
10 perhaps Taylor Swift is really popular in
11 Nashville. And so randomly, because part of
12 Nashville might be in the treatment, and part of
13 Nashville is in the control, we're comparing really
14 like to like. And they might actually have access
15 to the exact same radio experience.

16 And so because we're randomizing and
17 running an experiment and we're manipulating the
18 experiment, so running a real experiment, we can
19 actually control for all of those things.

20 And so, if we had had those data and
21 been able to control for it, it's my contention
22 that our -- our confidence intervals would be
23 tighter. We would have a more exact estimate and
24 higher statistical significance.

25 So we didn't do it. But because of the

1 randomization and the design of the study, it's
2 part of the reason we're able to control for that
3 difference. And that's a core difference between
4 observational and correlation.

5 In causation, because we're balancing
6 all of those differences, is this music on
7 terrestrial radio here or not, because it's
8 entirely balanced, we're able to account for that.

9 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Thank you.

10 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

11 Q. And so just to follow up on that,
12 consumers who, for example, may have seen a TV show
13 like "The Voice," and then decided to go buy their
14 artist music, those purchases were counted in the
15 purchases you called the Pandora spin -- you know,
16 the effect of Pandora's performances, right?

17 A. We did. We included all sales from
18 those regions.

19 Q. And to follow up on your answer to
20 Judge Barnett, that's because you assumed that,
21 through your randomization, half the time those
22 performances would end up, you know, in a
23 controlled DMA and half in a treatment DMA?

24 A. That's not an assumption. That's
25 testable. So for that to be true, all we had to do

1 was test whether or not we successfully randomized.

2 It is the exact same requirement for any clinical

3 trial to be valid. Did we randomize correctly.

4 And we tested that.

5 Q. Did you randomize for how many consumer

6 purchases occurred as a result of a consumer

7 listening to Taylor Perry when she was hot on the

8 radio?

9 A. I really don't know what that means.

10 Q. Well, let me ask you. You say that

11 randomization is the way you can test for whether

12 you've controlled for these circumstances.

13 So my question to you sir, is --

14 MR. MARKS: My objection is just that

15 it mischaracterizes the witness's testimony. I

16 believe he was characterizing what he said. I

17 don't think it was an accurate or fair

18 characterization.

19 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Would you

20 rephrase.

21 MR. CHOUDHURY: I'll rephrase, yes.

22 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

23 Q. Did your randomization -- did your

24 study of your randomization specifically look at

25 whether a consumer purchased music after watching a

1 television show of their favorite artist?

2 A. No. It seems quite unrelated.

3 Q. And did your study specifically test
4 whether a assumer purchased music after using an
5 interactive service?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did your study test whether a consumer
8 purchased music after attending a concert for their
9 favorite artist?

10 A. No.

11 Q. And did your study test whether a
12 consumer purchased music after watching a music
13 video?

14 A. No.

15 Q. And did your study test whether a
16 consumer purchased music while they were
17 simultaneously subject to other experiments on
18 Pandora?

19 A. No.

20 Q. And you agree with me that Pandora is
21 constantly running experiments on its users, right?

22 A. I agree we run lots of experiments for
23 research purposes.

24 Q. And so the subjects of your experiment
25 could have been subject to up to 50 different

1 experiments at any one time, right? Because that's

2 -- well, let me ask you.

3 Dr. McBride, how many experiments does
4 Pandora, on average, run on its listeners at any
5 given time?

6 A. 40 to 60.

7 Q. And so any given consumer on Pandora
8 could be subject to 40 to 60 different experiments
9 in a given time.

10 A. That's not correct.

11 Q. And -- well, let me see.

12 What is the hold-out group on Pandora?

13 A. There's many hold-out groups.

14 Q. But how many -- is there a hold-out
15 group that is exclusively excluded from all
16 experiments?

17 A. Yes. There's one of those.

18 Q. And that is about what percentage?

19 A. It's 1 percent of our listeners.

20 Q. Okay. But your experiments were not
21 subject to the hold-out group, right?

22 A. The steering experiments operated
23 through the AB framework. So yes, they did not --

24 Q. Just to be clear --

25 JUDGE STRICKLER: They did not what?

1 Let him finish the answer.

2 THE WITNESS: They did not affect or
3 interact in any way with that one hold-out group.

4 The music sales experiments operated
5 outside of the AB framework because we're not able
6 to randomize at the individual level because we
7 didn't have individual-level transaction data.

8 And so because they were randomized at
9 the region, and we were getting music sales from
10 off platform, all U.S. listeners with a ZIP code,
11 so 95 percent of all of our listeners, were
12 randomized. So they -- including people in our AB
13 framework hold-out group.

14 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

15 Q. And so you agree with me that the
16 subjects of the music sales experiment could have
17 been subject simultaneously to other experiments
18 from Pandora, correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Now, you determined the
21 treatment versus the control group -- I think we --
22 by looking at a user's ZIP code, correct?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. And that's the ZIP code they either
25 provided to Pandora when signing up or subsequently

1 updated, correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And I think you testified that Pandora
4 can sometimes prompt users to update their ZIP
5 code, correct?

6 A. We do do that sometimes.

7 Q. But you didn't prompt any users to
8 update their ZIP code as part of the music sales
9 experiment, right?

10 A. I did not.

11 Q. And so, if they hadn't updated their
12 ZIP code, and they moved, you would be using the
13 incorrect ZIP code, right?

14 A. This goes to the dilution point I went
15 about earlier. But yes, I agree. They would be in
16 a control region if they were assigned to
17 treatment, and --

18 Q. Just so we make it very clear. I think
19 we talked about this in your deposition.

20 If I was a user who lived in Washington
21 State, and then I moved to Washington, D.C., but I
22 didn't update my ZIP code, your experiment would
23 have called me a Washington State user, correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 JUDGE STRICKLER: And sometimes he

1 would have shown up in the treated group, and
2 sometimes he would have shown up in the untreated
3 group?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. Because of the
5 regional variations across all of the experiments.

6 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

7 Q. And you're aware that -- or are you
8 aware that, among younger demographics, like 18 to
9 25, those individuals frequently move, correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you didn't do anything to
12 particularly update the ZIP codes of that
13 demographic, correct?

14 A. I didn't update the ZIP code data, no.

15 Q. And you matched up the sales by looking
16 at sales within a DMA, right, from Nielsen
17 SoundScan?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And how does Nielsen SoundScan
20 determine what sales occur in a DMA?

21 A. They get data from retailers from where
22 the sale occurred.

23 Q. On where the sale occurred, correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. So if I drive to another DMA -- for

1 example, I live in one Nashville DMA; I drive to
2 the other one -- you would have reported the sale
3 where it occurred, correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Even if my registered ZIP code with
6 Pandora was in the first DMA --

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. -- correct?

9 And that would have been a mismatch in
10 your data between where the sale occurred and where
11 the user was, as far as Pandora is concerned,
12 experiencing the treatment.

13 A. So they would experience that treatment
14 anywhere. But I would agree that we would allocate
15 them to a region that they were not resident and
16 they would make purchases elsewhere, in -- in your
17 situation.

18 Q. And you tried to use predictive
19 information about sales in the DMA; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But that predictive information
22 wouldn't necessarily measure the sales of a song
23 that was new to Pandora, correct?

24 A. I -- can you explain that?

25 Q. Your predictive information about a DMA

1 was predictive information about past sales in the
2 DMA, correct?

3 A. Yes. Absolutely. Certainly
4 pre-experiment.

5 Q. Right.

6 And you know that albums have
7 lifecycles of sales, right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. They tend to sell more upon release and
10 less in the weeks that follow?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And so, if a song was new to Pandora,
13 that would be at a particular point in its
14 lifecycle, correct?

15 A. All over the lifecycle. We have new
16 music on Pandora that is very new to the world.
17 And we ingest and have new music on the service
18 that is a little older, yes.

19 Q. And I know you haven't studied
20 seasonality.

21 Did you account for seasonality in this
22 experiment?

23 A. We did not.

24 Q. And all of the music sales experiments
25 occurred over the summer, correct?

1 A. Starting at different periods. But
2 yes, they all occurred over the summer of 2014.

3 Q. And one thing you did find out is that
4 sales releases are actually higher in the music
5 industry in the summer, correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But you didn't do anything to control
8 for any possible seasonality effect?

9 A. So those are different. But I agree
10 that I didn't account for that. So --

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: So you said that's
12 different.

13 What's different?

14 THE WITNESS: Right. So seasonality I
15 interpret as differences in purchasing patterns
16 rather than more music being available and you
17 purchasing at the same rate, but there's a greater
18 quantity. And because we're calculating a
19 percentage, it's --

20 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

21 Q. In terms of what a sale meant for your
22 study, you didn't include physical singles, right?

23 A. We did not.

24 Would you like to know why?

25 Q. Well, because it's not in the Nielsen

1 SoundScan data, correct?

2 A. Sorry. Say that again.

3 Q. It isn't reported to you by Nielsen
4 SoundScan, correct?

5 A. No. Incorrect. Nielsen's
6 representatives said it's not worth it, that there
7 are 1,000 units of physical sales per week, and
8 since we were getting around 5 million total sales
9 a week --

10 Q. See, but you -- and you made an
11 independent judgment, too, that you didn't think it
12 was worth it to include it in the study, correct?

13 A. We decided not to include that
14 additional form that where Pandora could be
15 promotional.

16 Q. Let's understand how -- if an album is
17 purchased, how that counted in your study.

18 So if an album was purchased, you used
19 what you called track equivalent album; you counted
20 that as ten sales, correct?

21 A. So yes, it counted as ten units, which
22 is Nielsen's measure of the average number of
23 tracks per album.

24 Q. Right.

25 And you used what Nielsen said, right?

1 A. We used their standard measure of units
2 of sale, yes.

3 Q. And in the new music sales experiments,
4 let's understand how an experiment's created.

5 So a song comes into Pandora, Song A,
6 let's call it, correct? Right?

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. And it meets your inclusion criteria.

9 And so then the album that song A is on
10 becomes an experiment, correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Now, if there is Song B on the same
13 album, and I purchase Song B, do you count that as
14 a sale toward that experiment?

15 A. Yes. That was one unit of sale.

16 Q. Even if Song A is the one that is
17 manipulated in the treatment and control?

18 A. No. All of tracks on that album, A, B,
19 C, through let's say F, would also be included.
20 All of those would be turned off for a person in
21 the control.

22 Q. But if Song A is the new-to-Pandora,
23 how do we know that Song B was even ever going to
24 play on Pandora?

25 A. So we don't. That said, if we're not

1 manipulating it, we're driving our promotional
2 effect down.

3 Q. But, of course, you're still counting
4 those sales as sales towards the total sales that
5 you're measuring, correct?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Okay. And you chose to end the
8 experiments after eight weeks and then, in one
9 instance, after four weeks, correct?

10 A. We designed our experiments before
11 starting them. And we set periods of
12 experimentation, which were, in all cases, eight
13 weeks with the exception of the final ones, which I
14 agree were four weeks.

15 Q. And did you decide, prior to starting
16 experiments, that the final one would be four
17 weeks?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And why did you want to have one
20 four-week experiment and the rest of them eight
21 weeks?

22 A. We were required to finish our research
23 prior to the filing of evidence in this case.

24 JUDGE STRICKLER: Required by whom?

25 THE WITNESS: Pandora broadly. We --

1 part of it was we had a limited access to data from
2 Nielsen SoundScan, which had an end date from our
3 original agreement. So we had to meet that.

4 That end date was based originally on
5 needing to finish our research by the end of the
6 period.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: The period meaning --
8 being defined as what?

9 THE WITNESS: The period of research
10 where we could get access to music sales data from
11 Nielsen. And so our agreement with Nielsen I think
12 ended September 13.

13 JUDGE STRICKLER: And the period -- the
14 end date was a function, in part, of when evidence
15 needed to be submitted in this proceeding?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 JUDGE STRICKLER: Thank you.

18 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

19 Q. And just to follow up on that, you knew
20 that the margin of error in your study would
21 decrease if you extended the experiment out to 12
22 weeks or 16 weeks, correct?

23 A. Yes. We did many studies before
24 starting experiments to design our experiments.

25 Q. Right.

1 But you chose eight weeks and for
2 weeks, correct?

3 A. We analyzed the data that you might
4 present would show that we would get precise
5 estimates of a promotional effect, if there be one,
6 using eight weeks' data. We made the judgment to
7 use eight weeks.

8 Q. Now, Dr. McBride, I want to take a look
9 at some of the results that we were looking at. So
10 if we can start with Table 4 in your testimony.
11 And if you -- if you want to look at that.

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Can you give us a
13 page reference, please.

14 MR. CHOUDHURY: I wish I could. It's
15 in the middle of his written direct testimony, but
16 it's not actually page numbered.

17 JUDGE STRICKLER: Figure or a Table 4?

18 MR. CHOUDHURY: So it's -- I want to
19 look at Table 4. And so this is between Table 3
20 and 5.

21 This is -- so there's the testimony,
22 then the figures, then the tables. And this is the
23 one that says "Music Sales Experiment Effective
24 Performance on Pandora By Music Ownership Group."

25 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

1 Q. Now, I think we discussed this in your
2 direct, that you did not find a statistically
3 significant effect on what you label here as other
4 recording label, correct?

5 A. I agree.

6 Q. And if we look at -- within the
7 confidence interval there, noting that it's not
8 statistically significant result, am I reading this
9 correct that, when it says negative 2.86, that
10 would be the possibility of substitution?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And if we look at the confidence
13 intervals for majors where you found a
14 statistically significant result, within the
15 confidence interval there's still a possible effect
16 of less than 1 percent, correct?

17 A. That's the lower range, but yes.

18 Q. So now if we could turn to Table 7.

19 So now, if we look at Table 7 with
20 respect to the new music experiments, am I correct
21 that this is the same experiments, but you're using
22 a Poisson regression as your estimator instead of
23 TMLE, correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And here you do not find a

1 statistically significant result, correct?

2 A. Not at 5 percent. I agree.

3 Q. And, in fact, if we look at the Poisson
4 regression, you find the possibility of
5 substitution within the confidence interval of all
6 experiments, majors and others, correct?

7 A. I presume you're talking about new
8 music and not --

9 Q. Yes. The new music.

10 A. Oh, okay. Yes. That's correct.

11 Q. Now, you made the decision to use the
12 TMLE methodology as your estimator, correct?

13 A. My colleagues and I, as researchers,
14 prior to experimentation, before we had any data,
15 we did select that as our estimator, yes.

16 Q. So you -- but you had personally never
17 used TMLE, right?

18 A. I had not.

19 Q. And also that's true with the respect
20 to your six years at Analysis Group; you never used
21 TMLE there, right?

22 A. That's correct.

23 JUDGE STRICKLER: Excuse me.

24 You said you decided to use TMLE before
25 you ever had any of the data.

1 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

2 JUDGE STRICKLER: Is there
3 documentation to that effect?

4 THE WITNESS: We didn't write that
5 down. What we can say and is -- has been produced
6 is that we used it to analyze the pilot prior to
7 having any data.

8 And what I would say more broadly is my
9 colleague, Oliver Bembom, who assisted with this
10 research, his adviser was the creator of this
11 method. He used it numerous times at previous
12 work.

13 And for numerous statistical
14 properties, specifically contrary to the Poisson
15 regression, it's proven mathematically to produce
16 the smallest confidence interval, the most precise
17 estimate for promotion or substitutional effect.

18 JUDGE STRICKLER: So you used the TMLE
19 when you did the pilot?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, we did.

21 JUDGE STRICKLER: Is there
22 documentation of that in the record?

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, there is.

24 JUDGE STRICKLER: In your report?

25 THE WITNESS: It was in the materials

1 that were provided as exhibits last night.

2 MR. MARKS: And, Your Honor, if I could
3 clarify one question.

4 I think it's possible the witness may
5 be confusing your question about whether or not
6 something in the record with whether or not it's
7 reflected in information that was produced during
8 the discovery phase.

9 JUDGE STRICKLER: Fair enough. So let
10 me ask counsel is the use of TMLE in the pilot
11 project something that's been in evidence in this
12 case now?

13 MR. MARKS: I don't believe so beyond
14 his testimony.

15 MR. CHOUDHURY: And we -- I think, when
16 we get to the restricted section, we'll get --
17 we'll look at that document.

18 JUDGE STRICKLER: Okay. We'll wait.

19 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

20 Q. So just with respect to TMLE, you
21 didn't discover TMLE through your college, Oliver
22 Bambom, right?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. How did you discover it?

25 A. I ran into a professor who mentioned

1 it.

2 Q. And that was at the airport, and this
3 is the Berkeley statistics professor?

4 A. He's a Berkeley professor, I believe of
5 econometrics, but...

6 Q. And you did take a graduate statistics
7 course just a year or two ago, correct?

8 A. I took two courses, one of which I
9 audited. A data analysis, empirical analysis
10 course using a particular statistics language from
11 Stanford. And I also took another course through
12 an online source.

13 Q. And neither of those courses refer to
14 TMLE, correct?

15 A. They do not cover that, no.

16 Q. And in your work at Analysis Group, did
17 you know anyone else who applied TMLE?

18 A. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. Now, I think a second ago, in response
20 to Judge Strickler's question, you said that TMLE
21 has a very small confidence number, right?

22 A. That's a math proof, yes.

23 Q. And so, therefore, it's most likely to
24 generate a statistically significant result, right?

25 A. I mean yes and no. I mean that is

1 certainly the implication. But that's because of a
2 core statistical property, which is that it is
3 efficient. It has the smallest confidence
4 interval.

5 Q. Right.

6 And so the answer to my question is it
7 is most likely to generate a statistically
8 significant result, right?

9 A. If there is, in fact, a true effect.

10 Q. And if the music sales experiment found
11 a statistically significant result that was not
12 promotional, that would be helpful to the evidence
13 Pandora presents in this proceeding, correct?

14 A. That's seems logical.

15 Q. And you knew that these studies were
16 done at the direction of counsel, correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And that, if they were helpful, they
19 were likely to be offered in this proceeding,
20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And when you were conducting the study,
23 you were assuming that, if they did not -- if they
24 were not helpful, they would not be used in this
25 proceeding, correct?

1 A. So I assumed that they would not be
2 presented by Pandora. But I have no sense of the
3 discovery process, whether or not they would be
4 provide by yourselves.

5 Q. So when you were making the decision to
6 use TMLE, you knew it was most likely to produce a
7 statistically significant result, correct?

8 A. It satisfies -- it has that
9 implication.

10 Q. And that result, if net promotional,
11 would be helpful to Pandora in this proceeding,
12 correct?

13 A. Among other settings, yes.

14 Q. And if net substitutional, you were
15 assuming that Pandora would not present that study
16 in this proceeding, correct?

17 A. I -- yes.

18 Q. And the steering experiments, they did
19 not use the TMLE methodology as an estimator,
20 right?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. And those were done at Dr. Shapiro's
23 instruction, correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And he is not a full-time Pandora

1 employee, right?

2 A. He is not.

3 Q. And at his instruction, you used a
4 difference in unconditional means analysis,
5 correct?

6 A. Yes, we did.

7 Q. If you had used a difference in
8 unconditional means analysis for the music sales
9 experiments, you would agree with me that your
10 results were much more likely to have not been
11 statistically significant, correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And even though you knew that, you
14 didn't attempt to use analysis under this
15 difference in unconditional means, which I think at
16 least you can tell us is not -- is the more
17 conventional estimator, correct?

18 A. It's also -- it is more conventional,
19 and it's also inappropriate in this setting.

20 Q. I'd like to take a look at Table 5.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. So here is where you attempt to
23 put a per-spin effect on the revenue to labels and
24 artists, correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And what you see here is that, using
2 your own numbers, the per-spin effect on catalog is
3 much smaller than the per-spin effect you found on
4 the new music sales experiments, right?

5 A. That's direct.

6 Q. And there, in fact, is not a
7 statistically significant effect when we look at
8 other recording labels under new music experiments,
9 right?

10 A. I agree.

11 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to
12 Footnote 1. Here it says: "Results are cents per
13 spin assuming that track equivalent units sell for
14 \$1," correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And this assumption is important to
17 your calculation in this table, correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. And that's not -- \$1 is not the
20 revenue that a label or artist receives from a sale
21 of a single, correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Because a label or artist receives
24 approximately 70 percent of the sale, correct?

25 A. That's my understanding.

1 Q. And so, when a song is sold, a label or
2 artist would actually receive 70 cents, not a
3 dollar, correct?

4 A. I agree.

5 Q. And so if that's true, then Table 5 is
6 not an accurate statement of the revenue to labels
7 and artists, right?

8 A. I think the title is not as clear as I
9 would like. This estimate of retail price, and I
10 agree -- so this is gross, and then there is a net
11 implication.

12 Q. Right.

13 So you agree with me that this does not
14 reflect the revenue to labels and artists.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you didn't consult with anybody
17 about whether \$1 a track was the appropriate
18 assumption, right?

19 A. I didn't when I submitted it.

20 Q. And you didn't consult with any
21 industry sources either, right?

22 A. Not when I submitted this.

23 Q. At the time of your study, you also
24 weren't aware of the average album price in the
25 industry, correct?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And you didn't look at how catalog
3 albums are priced in the industry, correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. And you aren't aware of whether
6 download signals could be priced at a retail level
7 lower than a dollar, correct?

8 A. I knew that to be true.

9 MR. CHOUDHURY: Okay. Mr. Nichols, I'm
10 going to ask you if you can pull up the first
11 demonstrative, please. And yeah, we've also handed
12 out the demonstrative slides there in the folder.

13 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

14 Q. Dr. McBride, do you recognize this?

15 A. I do.

16 Q. Okay. What is this?

17 A. This is Apple iTunes, which was
18 accessed by Philip recently. And it shows some of
19 the recent songs that were available for sale for
20 digital download from iTunes and also shows their
21 prices.

22 Q. And you would agree with me that at
23 least some of the downloads are sold at 69 cents,
24 correct?

25 A. I see that, yes.

1 Q. And do you also see in the top left
2 where it says: "New album plus 7.99 albums"?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. So you'd agree with me that some albums
5 are priced at 7.99, correct?

6 A. I interpret it that way, yes.

7 Q. And so, if we assume that an album was
8 ten songs, that would actually be less than a
9 dollar a song, correct?

10 A. That would be.

11 MR. CHOUDHURY: And if we can go to the
12 second slide.

13 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

14 Q. Dr. McBride, here we're looking at the
15 B.B. King album, which I think if we got lower on
16 the first demonstrative, you'd see is actually on
17 the top 10 right now.

18 Do you see that it's a 7.99 buy?

19 A. I see that it's priced at -- oh, sorry.
20 Yes. I see exactly those words.

21 Q. And that is, in fact -- and I'm going
22 to represent to you it's, in fact, a top 10 album,
23 correct?

24 A. I'll accept that representation.

25 Q. So even new albums or albums that are

1 -- let's not say new albums. Let's withdraw that.

2 Even albums that are high on the charts
3 can be priced below \$10, correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Just so we're clear, you didn't have
6 anyone look at the price of the albums in your
7 experiment at the time of the experiment, correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And you didn't have anyone look at the
10 price of the digital singles in your experiment at
11 the time of the experiment, correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. That was true for both the new music
14 sales and the catalog music sales experiments,
15 right?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. And you haven't done any analysis to
18 see how sensitive the results you're reporting in
19 Table 5 are to your assumption in Footnote 1,
20 correct?

21 A. It's straight math. So any changes in
22 that assumption would directly scale the numbers.
23 So if the number were 25 percent higher, all of the
24 numbers in the table would be exactly 25 percent
25 larger. If it was 25 percent lower, all the

1 numbers on the table would be exactly lower.

2 Q. And if you looked at Table 6, Table 6
3 is dependent on your results from Table 5, correct?

4 A. It is.

5 Q. So if those were incorrect, so too
6 would be Table 6, correct?

7 A. So the effect estimate in revenue terms
8 would be affected by the price assumption. The
9 confidence interval and the P value, whether or not
10 the results are statistically significant, are not
11 dependent on the assumed price.

12 Q. So thank you for that clarification.

13 If we look at Footnote 1 on Table 6,
14 are you making the same assumption in Footnote 1,
15 Table 6, that you made in Footnote 1 of Table 5?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, if we can look at Figure 3(a). So
18 this is a figure. So we're now pretables.

19 A. Sorry for that.

20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Do you have a
21 page number for that one?

22 MR. CHOUDHURY: You know, it -- the
23 figures are right before the tables.

24 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Oh, thank you.

25 MR. CHOUDHURY: So I can give you

1 the -- between Figure 2 and Figure 3(b).

2 THE WITNESS: I apologize for not
3 having sequential numbering.

4 JUDGE STRICKLER: 3(a)?

5 MR. CHOUDHURY: 3(a).

6 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

7 Q. And this was a figure that we looked at
8 during your direct examination, correct.

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Now, you would agree with me that, on
11 all three of your graphs, at the 50-spin-per-sale
12 threshold, you find a statistically insignificant
13 result, correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. So just so we're clear, it's not a
16 linear dosage; it's not that, the more spins per
17 sale, it'll automatically increase, correct?

18 A. I don't think that interpretation can
19 be made from a single data point. A linear
20 relationship can still have noise around it.

21 So if you drew a line, that could still
22 fall within the upper confidence bands of those
23 points. So I agree that those points are
24 insignificant.

25 Q. And, Dr. McBride, do you have any

1 explanation for why you get a statistically
2 insignificant result at every -- on all three
3 charts at the 50-spin-per-sale threshold but not
4 necessarily at thresholds lower than that?

5 A. I think it's -- the data are speaking.
6 These are the results.

7 Q. Okay. If we can look at Page 21 of
8 your written direct testimony.

9 A. I'm there.

10 Q. So there you write: "It's logical that
11 Pandora would not create a detectible impact on
12 sales for songs that are playing heavily on
13 alternative platforms while playing very little
14 relatively on Pandora," right?

15 And we used Taylor Swift as an example,
16 so of course that got my attention, right?

17 So what we're talking about here is the
18 dosing effect, correct?

19 A. So -- largely, yes.

20 Q. And what you're saying here is that, if
21 a song is spinning on an alternative platform at a
22 very high level, for example, it's getting a lot of
23 terrestrial spins, and it's not spinning that much
24 on Pandora, you wouldn't actually see a very large
25 promotional effect, right?

1 A. That stands to reason.

2 Q. And so, as long as a song is spinning
3 on an alternative platform at a high level, you
4 wouldn't actually see the large promotional effect
5 that you're reporting in your study, correct?

6 A. Sorry. Could you repeat that, please.

7 Q. Sure.

8 Here we're looking at Paragraph 46.

9 And what you're explaining there, I believe, but
10 correct me if I'm wrong, is that, if a song is
11 spinning on an alternative platform at a high rate,
12 but it's spinning relatively little at Pandora, you
13 wouldn't expect to see a promotional effect, right?

14 A. I -- if it's spinning at a low rate, I
15 agree.

16 Q. And so the promotional effect of
17 Pandora is actually dependent in some sense on the
18 availability of the song on alternative platforms,
19 correct?

20 A. So our ability to estimate it does not,
21 but the estimate amount might -- might depend on
22 whether it's --

23 Q. Right.

24 You would estimate a lower promotional
25 effect if a song was spinning heavily on

1 alternative platforms, correct?

2 A. That's not what I said. What I said
3 was, when that's true and it's spinning very little
4 on Pandora.

5 So it stands to reason to me, if it has
6 essentially no exposure on our service, I don't --
7 I find it unlikely that we would be promotional for
8 that. I'm sure we cannot defect it when we have
9 such a minuscule effect relatively.

10 Q. Well, the logical inference you're
11 drawing is that the availability of a song on an
12 alternative platform would affect the possible
13 promotional effect on Pandora, correct?

14 A. I didn't say that.

15 Q. Okay. I just want to be clear. I
16 think we talked about this earlier.

17 You testified about these experiments
18 in the BMI rate court proceeding, correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And you're aware that Judge Stanton had
21 issued a decision in that proceeding, correct?

22 A. I'm told that's the case, yes.

23 Q. Do you know whether Judge Stanton
24 relied on the music sales experiments as part of
25 their opinion?

1 MR. MARKS: I'm just going to object to
2 the -- just caution the witness -- I don't know
3 what the witness -- if he has an understanding
4 other than as a result of conversation of counsel.
5 But I just want to be clear it's not going to be
6 intruding on conversations that Dr. McBride may
7 have had with counsel.

8 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: If you can answer
9 the question without revealing a conversation
10 you've had with counsel, then you may answer.

11 JUDGE STRICKLER: Also, just -- didn't
12 we hear this morning that the decision is
13 embargoed? So if it's embargoed, even if he knows,
14 why would we violate the embargo and let him say
15 something that he knows otherwise is --

16 MR. CHOUDHURY: Your Honor, I'll
17 withdraw the question.

18 And, in fact, at that point, we should
19 move to restricted session for the rest.

20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. We will be
21 closing the hearing room now to anyone who has not
22 signed the nondisclosure certification.

23 MR. CHOUDHURY: I actually have a few
24 more public questions, but -- so people can hang
25 around while I'm asking them if they want.

1 THE WITNESS: I'll stay.

2 MR. CHOUDHURY: Great. Me too.

3 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

4 Q. Dr. McBride, I want you to assume for a
5 second that, in your experiment, 90 out of a
6 hundred listeners stopped buying music because of
7 what they heard of Pandora. They just -- they
8 decided to walk away. And ten out of the hundred
9 users decided to buy more music because of what
10 they heard on Pandora.

11 Does your experiment show the effect on
12 the 90 users who walked away?

13 JUDGE STRICKLER: When you say walk
14 away, you mean walk away from purchasing?

15 MR. CHOUDHURY: From purchasing.

16 THE WITNESS: I think so. Because they
17 would be randomized between treatment and control.

18 BY MR. CHOUDHURY:

19 Q. So if someone chooses not to purchase,
20 in this example the 90, how would we see that in
21 your results?

22 A. So sorry. You're saying that 90
23 percent have chosen not to purchase anything. We
24 see a difference in whether or not there are sales.

25 So your hypothesizing that Pandora

1 caused them to stop purchasing?

2 Q. For example, they thought that Pandora
3 was satisfying enough that it was net
4 substitutional for them.

5 A. I'll have to think about it more. My
6 general sense is that it's an extreme hypothetical.
7 If they're randomized, we would not see any
8 promotional or substitutional effect.

9 Q. And for any individual user who decided
10 not to purchase because of what they heard on
11 Pandora, how would we see that substitution effect
12 reflected in your results?

13 A. That would not directly be observable.
14 We would observe other effects.

15 MR. CHOUDHURY: Okay. Now let's move
16 into a few restricted questions about some of the
17 documents.

18 (THIS ENDS PUBLIC SESSION)

19 (RESTRICTED SESSION BOUND SEPARATELY)

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1 (THIS BEGINS PUBLIC SESSION)

2 MR. RICH: Thank you, Your Honors.

3 REBUTTAL EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR PANDORA

4 (CONTINUED)

5 BY MR. RICH:

6 Q. Welcome back, Professor Shapiro.

7 A. Thank you.

8 Q. I wish I could say it feels like
9 yesterday, but honestly, it doesn't.

10 We left off -- still covering on your
11 prior examination, a series of topics drawn from
12 your original rebuttal testimony.

13 Do you recall that?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. And just to recenter where we are, if
16 you will take a look at the first -- pardon me, at
17 the second document in the demonstrative which
18 begins: "Seven major topics."

19 Do you have that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. We covered Topics 1 through 4 as of the
22 time we interrupted your examination, and
23 therefore, Your Honors, we're going to pick up with
24 Topics 5 through 7 beginning this afternoon.

25 So Topic 5, Professor Shapiro, relates

1 to Professor Rubinfeld's theory of convergence,
2 which you discuss in considerable detail in your
3 written rebuttal testimony principally at Pages 42
4 to 47; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. So as a preliminary matter, at a high
7 level, what is your reaction to Professor
8 Rubinfeld's convergence analysis?

9 A. So I have two main points regarding
10 convergence. First is, I think it's disconnected
11 from the benchmarking exercise that we're -- when
12 we really get down to it, in terms of setting the
13 rates.

14 The second, I think that the way it has
15 been portrayed and used is quite inaccurate in
16 terms of what is going on in the market.

17 Q. So we're going to drill down on both of
18 those, but as a preliminary, what is it you
19 understand to be Professor Rubinfeld's central
20 thesis as it relates to convergence?

21 A. Well, as he states in his written
22 direct testimony, his convergence theory is that
23 interactive services on the one hand and Webcasters
24 on the other are relatively close substitutes.

25 Q. So assuming for the moment that that

1 premise was factually correct and proven, we will
2 come back to that in a bit, even so, in your
3 opinion, would that justify and support the use of
4 the proposed interactive benchmark in this
5 proceeding?

6 A. No, it would not.

7 Q. Can you explain to the judges why you
8 have concluded that it would not, and feel free to
9 make reference back to our favorite Figure 5 as
10 part of that.

11 A. I have it and I've already turned to
12 Figure 5, so I -- I think you all have, Your
13 Honors, the slide deck so I told you this was going
14 to be my go-to figure and here we are.

15 Just to remind you, this depicts the
16 downstream market for listeners and then the two
17 upstream markets we have been talking about, the
18 interactive market and the statutory or Webcasting
19 market.

20 So convergence is a claim or a
21 statement about the downstream market, that the
22 interactive services are relatively close
23 substitutes to the statutory Webcasting services.
24 We are ultimately -- when we get back to the
25 benchmarking, going to be talking about -- we have

1 a proposed benchmark by Professor Rubinfeld in the
2 interactive upstream market, and he is making a
3 claim that is a good benchmark for the statutory
4 market.

5 That involves a comparison of two
6 upstream markets, while as the convergence theory
7 is about the downstream market. So there is a
8 disconnect right there as a starting point.

9 Q. And --

10 JUDGE STRICKLER: Excuse me. Again,
11 this goes back to your testimony from several days
12 ago, Professor, the difference between upstream
13 market is that in the interactive market, the
14 repertoire from the various services, various
15 record companies are must-haves or essential for
16 the interactive, whereas your testimony are not for
17 the noninteractive; is that correct?

18 THE WITNESS: Not quite right. The
19 starting point here is -- the first part of that,
20 yes, absolutely. They, I think, generally it's
21 been established that the major record company
22 repertoires are must-haves for the interactive
23 services.

24 And that is the problem that -- I think
25 we have monopoly rates in that market. I have not

1 said -- I don't know one way or another about
2 whether the major record companies are must-haves
3 in the statutory market. So this argument is not
4 based on that. Such a claim there.

5 JUDGE STRICKLER: Maybe we are getting
6 ahead of ourselves, but is the concept of steering
7 that's injected into your testimony designed to
8 show that they are and must-haves to the same
9 extent to the noninteractive market as they are to
10 the interactive market?

11 THE WITNESS: I think of steering and
12 must-haves as two separate concepts. Steering is
13 -- refers to the -- we are going to be talking
14 quite a bit tomorrow as well, refers to the ability
15 of a service to shift the mix of the performance.
16 That is the music that played to their users or
17 listeners, in particular, in response to different
18 royalty rates, so that is a -- shifting the mix.
19 Must-have is what happens to a service if they have
20 complete lack of access to an entire repertoire.
21 Those are different questions.

22 JUDGE STRICKLER: Are you going to
23 address whether you considered the repertoire of
24 all the majors as must-haves in the noninteractive
25 market as your testimony continues?

1 THE WITNESS: My -- so in terms of the
2 rebuttal part of my testimony, neither parts of my
3 testimony is --

4 JUDGE STRICKLER: Hang on one second.

5 MR. POMERANTZ: This is an issue that
6 we addressed the last time that Professor Shapiro
7 was here and I think an objection that I made was
8 sustained because he did not offer an opinion on
9 that subject, either in his written testimony or --
10 well, in his written testimony, either rebuttal or
11 direct, and therefore, we felt it was not proper
12 for him to offer an opinion now and I believe that
13 objection was sustained.

14 JUDGE STRICKLER: In any event, I think
15 it deals with -- I think it deals with his direct
16 testimony rather than his rebuttal testimony, so
17 maybe I just jumped gun by asking that question
18 now. Maybe we revisit that -- this whole issue.

19 THE WITNESS: I think I can clarify
20 without -- while being respectful of
21 Mr. Pomerantz's objection.

22 JUDGE STRICKLER: It is leading into
23 your direct testimony so why don't we just wait.
24 Hold it and continue on with the rebuttal.

25 MR. RICH: We are entirely flexible

1 with whatever Your Honors prefer.

2 BY MR. RICH:

3 Q. Staying with -- again, the factual
4 premise, taking it for the sake of discussion to be
5 true, that interactive and noninteractive services
6 are, as Professor Rubinfeld asserts, relatively
7 close substitutes, what would that tell us about
8 whether interactive and noninteractive services are
9 similar buyers in the relevant upstream market
10 here?

11 A. So it does not -- the convergence
12 theory does not imply that they are similar buyers
13 in the upstream market. So Professor Rubinfeld's
14 own test for benchmark asks, are they similar
15 buyers. And convergence, he falls back on that to
16 defend the use of the benchmark but it is not
17 actually about the buyers, the two buyers in the --
18 as licensees of recorded music.

19 So it doesn't address the -- go to his
20 own tests. Again, I come back -- the fundamental
21 problem is we have monopoly rates in the
22 interactive market and convergence does not address
23 that fundamental flaw with his benchmark.

24 Q. Again, taking as a given for purposes
25 of just this portion of our examination, that

1 interactive and noninteractive services are
2 relatively close substitutes as Professor Rubinfeld
3 asserts, what would that tell us about whether the
4 royalty rates as a percentage of retail price
5 should be equivalent between those paid by
6 interactive services and those paid by
7 noninteractive services?

8 A. It would not indicate that those ratios
9 should be the same, even if convergence is true.

10 Q. Reason is?

11 A. The downstream market, competition
12 there does not lead to this equilibration in the
13 upstream market. There is no theory that implies
14 that. Professor Rubinfeld has offered none at all.
15 It's just disconnected.

16 Q. Now at Pages 46 and 47 of your written
17 rebuttal testimony, you note that Professor
18 Rubinfeld's convergence argument in this respect is
19 not only flawed, you call it dangerous.

20 Do you recall that?

21 A. I do.

22 Q. What did you mean when you wrote that?

23 A. I meant that if you accept convergence
24 as a basis for using the interactive benchmark,
25 then you are in real danger of taking a monopoly

1 rate that we see in the interactive market and
2 importing it over to the statutory market where we
3 are trying to establish a rate that reflects
4 competition. That would be, I think undesirable
5 for a lot of reasons, and would essentially
6 propagate the monopoly situation into another
7 market.

8 Q. Now turning back to the factual basis
9 for Professor Rubinfeld's convergence thesis, what
10 form of investigation do you understand Professor
11 Rubinfeld to have undertaken to reach his
12 conclusions?

13 A. In his written direct testimony, he has
14 a section devoted to convergence and he described
15 some similarities between the services, interactive
16 and statutory services, and offered some other
17 qualitative discussion that is the basis for
18 convergence.

19 Q. How would you assess the degree of
20 persuasiveness or rigor of Professor Rubinfeld's
21 methodology as an economist to determine whether
22 two products are reasonably close substitutes?

23 A. I'll leave it to the judges to assess
24 persuasiveness, but I can assess rigor. I think
25 this is really quite inadequate in terms of --

1 let's go back.

2 The question at issue is: Are
3 interactive services and statutory services
4 relatively close substitutes? That has a specific
5 meaning to an economist, substitutes. Is there a
6 lot of substitution by listeners from one type of
7 service to the other, if -- depending on the
8 relative prices or the qualities. That is what
9 economists mean by substitutes, and we measure that
10 through cross elasticity or diversion.

11 The starting point to do that is to
12 look in that market where the two types of products
13 compete, which is the downstream market, and
14 Professor Rubinfeld did not even do the first step,
15 which would be to look at market shares in that
16 market.

17 If you could flip back to -- what slide
18 is it here -- Slide 4 in this deck, we covered this
19 -- it was ten days ago, but...

20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Was it really
21 that long ago? Times flies when you're having fun.

22 THE WITNESS: I was having fun. I
23 don't know about you.

24 So just to remind you, this is the
25 market shares in the downstream market. So that's

1 a good starting point. By Professor Rubinfeld did
2 not even do that.

3 BY MR. RICH:

4 Q. Did you -- based on your review of
5 Professor Rubinfeld's written direct testimony, did
6 you locate any empirical evidence that he drew on
7 to indicate the significant numbers of listener
8 substitute between these two ways of getting music
9 in response to small changes in the relative price
10 or quality for the prices -- or -- between these
11 services?

12 A. No. He did not do that type of
13 analysis to assess the -- whether they're
14 relative -- a close substitute.

15 Q. Let's turn to any analysis you have
16 done of the issue of potential close
17 substitutability.

18 Have you performed any analysis along
19 those lines?

20 A. Well, the starting point is here
21 already in Figure 2. So we look at the market
22 shares. And this is common for industrial
23 organization economists.

24 So the first thing that jumps out --
25 and I had mentioned this when I was here before --

1 in Figure 2 is that terrestrial radio is basically
2 half of the market. And so that is a really
3 dominant feature. So I've looked into what the
4 relationship between Webcasting and terrestrial
5 radio, in particular. And that's what really I
6 think we find pretty clearly in the empirical
7 evidence is that Webcasting and terrestrial radio
8 are close substitutes.

9 Q. What is your understanding of what
10 analysis Professor Rubinfeld engaged in with
11 respect to the role which terrestrial radio plays
12 in the downstream market?

13 A. Well, he virtually ignores it. I think
14 he mentions it once or twice in passing in his
15 written direct testimony. So a very limited role
16 in his analysis.

17 Q. Did you review any survey work that was
18 done in connection with this proceeding addressing
19 the topic of potential close substitutability
20 between interactive service offerings and
21 noninteractive offerings?

22 A. Yes. So this is -- I believe you're
23 referring to the work by Larry Rosin, his survey
24 work regarding basically what -- how people are
25 shifting their listening, and their willingness to

1 pay for subscriber services.

2 Q. And you reproduced certain of his
3 results as part of this deck at the beginning of
4 Page 17?

5 A. Yes. That's right.

6 Q. And could you walk the judges through,
7 as you do in your written rebuttal testimony, some
8 of the conclusions relevant to competition in this
9 downstream market drawn from your analysis and
10 understanding of Mr. Rosin's survey results?

11 A. Sure. I'm happy to. So let's start at
12 Slide 17. And I know that Mr. Rosin has already
13 testified here, and you've seen these. So I'm
14 going to confine myself to how I used them and how
15 these results fit into my analysis.

16 So Slide 17, his figure 11, the
17 question: "Is the time you spend listening to
18 Pandora mostly replacing the time you used to spend
19 listening to," and then we see the answers.

20 So first just that question. That's
21 the type of substitution question that economists
22 are interested in. And the way I think about this
23 generally is streaming is growing, obviously. And
24 the question is where is it taking listening time
25 from, or what's it's effect overall?

1 And we're going to come back to this a
2 lot tomorrow as well. So what we're seeing here is
3 actually half of the listening time is new
4 listening. Okay. Which that's going to be
5 particularly important for other reasons.

6 But the convergence theory would say
7 the additional time listening on Pandora would be
8 coming at the expense of an interactive service, if
9 they were -- that's what you'd look for, to see if
10 they've a relatively close substitute.

11 And you absolutely do not see that.
12 The on-demand music service like Spotify or
13 Rhapsody here, is the tiny I guess orange or red
14 sliver. It's 1 percent. A much larger chunk, as
15 orange, is coming from terrestrial radio listening.

16 So that's a strong support for the
17 statement I made earlier that terrestrial radio is
18 a much closer substitute for Pandora than is
19 Spotify, for example.

20 Q. And turning to demonstrative 18, which
21 is another of Mr. Rosin and Edison Research's
22 conclusions, what's the relevance of that to this
23 discussion?

24 A. This is essentially the same finding
25 except we're asking -- he's asking a different set

1 of listeners. And these are -- if you look in the
2 lower-right corner, he reports the base, which is
3 who got asked this question. These are people who
4 have listened to other online music services in the
5 last week. Not Pandora.

6 So basically the results we just had
7 for Pandora apply for the other Webcasting
8 services.

9 Q. And what's the most relevant pie wedge
10 that addresses Professor Rubinfeld's thesis?

11 A. So again, the coloring is the same. So
12 it's the -- here we have 2 percent of the listening
13 is coming at the expense of Spotify or Rhapsody.
14 We had 1 percent before. Those are both very
15 small.

16 And now the terrestrial radio happens
17 to be a bit bigger. And the new listening times
18 remain, by far, the largest, the purple. So we're
19 getting the same story here.

20 JUDGE STRICKLER: You said a moment ago
21 with regard to the largest pie wedge there, the
22 purple wedge, new listening time not taken from
23 other sources of audio listening is going to be
24 important for other reasons.

25 Are you going to be addressing that in

1 your rebuttal testimony or in your direct
2 testimony?

3 THE WITNESS: It's going to come up in
4 my rebuttal testimony because it's one of the
5 reasons that Webcasting adds to record company
6 revenues. To the extent it's causing people to
7 listen more, it's generating incremental revenues
8 to the record company. That's our very next topic
9 in -- if we get to it today.

10 It's also going to come up in the
11 direct testimony because it's one reason the
12 opportunity costs to a record company of licensing
13 to a Webcaster is low, because Webcasting is not
14 cannibalizing other sources of music revenues.

15 JUDGE STRICKLER: Thank you.

16 JUDGE FEDER: Professor, if you turn
17 back to Figure 11 on Page 17, the question that was
18 posed was: "Is the time you spend listening to
19 Pandora mostly replacing the time you used to spend
20 listening to"...

21 And you opined that that means that
22 traditional over-the-air AM/FM radio is one of the
23 main sources of substitution for Pandora.

24 The way the question was posed is
25 really the other way around. Pandora is a

1 substitute for people who are listening to AM/FM
2 radio.

3 Is it possible that the way the
4 question was structured overlooks an effect of
5 people using Pandora, if you will, as a gateway to
6 other types of music services?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think it might
8 miss that because it's a snapshot. And I totally
9 take the first part of your question -- I agree
10 with that.

11 This is really strong substitution from
12 terrestrial radio to Pandora, which is one reason I
13 made the point. Streaming is growing. It's
14 cutting into other forms of listening and adding
15 new listening.

16 We're not seeing a lot of substitution
17 going the other way, people, you know, stopping
18 Pandora and turning on the radio. That's not the
19 phase of the world we're in.

20 But this other gateway type of thing,
21 you're just not going to pick that up in this
22 survey. I don't think it's capable of doing that
23 as a snapshot: What did you do now versus -- how
24 did you spend your time listening now versus
25 recently.

1 JUDGE FEDER: In a sense, isn't that
2 question really the question that the whole concept
3 of convergence is trying to get at?

4 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I
5 would say no. Because, again, as described by
6 Professor Rubinfeld, the view is that interactive
7 and noninteractive are close substitutes.

8 And again, I will have trouble with the
9 theory because it doesn't really connect to the
10 benchmarking exercise. But it is a statement
11 about, if Pandora gets better, they would be -- the
12 whole notion is, if they get better, people would
13 shift from Spotify to Pandora; or if Spotify gets
14 better, they'd shift the other direction. It's
15 that tug between the two.

16 And there is some of that, to be sure.
17 But it's really dwarfed by these other forces.

18 BY MR. RICH:

19 Q. If you could turn to Slide 19, please,
20 which is another -- a reproduction of another of
21 Edison Research's survey findings.

22 What do you derive from that relevant
23 to the instant conversation?

24 A. Okay. So this is a different question,
25 just to get our heads into this, which is the

1 question: For a paid on-demand -- on-demand
2 services, would you be -- how likely would you be
3 willing to pay 9.99 a month for such a service?

4 So is basically a way of scoping out
5 how many people are willing to pay ten bucks a
6 month for Spotify type of service.

7 And the answer is most people -- I
8 guess it's 88 percent are saying not at all likely
9 or not very likely. And they are asking people who
10 did use Pandora or another noninteractive online
11 service.

12 So this is, again, relevant to the
13 question we were just talking about, which is: Is
14 a Pandora user, are they kind of close to tempted
15 to sign up for Spotify for \$10 a month? And the
16 answer is, by and large, no.

17 Q. So again, just coming back to the main
18 premise here, which is, if one were testing as an
19 economist and trying to test fairly rigorously for
20 whether two products or service are relatively
21 close substitutes, just to be clear, what does this
22 slice at the pie -- no pun intended -- tell us
23 about that?

24 A. This is telling us that the Spotify
25 on-demand services are not a close substitute for

1 Pandora and the Webcasting services because the
2 current customers of Pandora are not attempted or
3 on the margin to shift to Spotify at \$10 a month,
4 by and large.

5 Of course, some are. And some are
6 using both services. I know that. But we're
7 talking about, in the main, that's not the case
8 that they would want to switch.

9 Q. And then turning to the next slide,
10 which asked the same question but at a lower price
11 point, what do you derive -- which is \$4.99,
12 correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What do you derive from that?

15 A. So not surprisingly, more people are
16 interested in Spotify at \$5 a month than \$10 a
17 month. But even so, you have -- would be 70
18 percent are saying not at all likely or not very
19 likely to subscribe.

20 These are, again, the users of Pandora
21 and other statutory services are not attempted to
22 or not inclined to go with an on-demand service for
23 \$5 a month.

24 So look, this all fits with -- my
25 interpretation of all this is there is a place in

1 the market for the interactive services, the
2 subscriber services, when say \$10 a month, which is
3 Spotify's main price. It's not a widespread
4 appeal. It's more of a niche product for the
5 audiophiles. Very cool, and a bunch of people love
6 it.

7 But, you know, Pandora is primarily
8 competing and seeking to grow in a -- a much bigger
9 game, if you will, with many larger -- much larger
10 number of subscribers. And their route to growth
11 is terrestrial radio.

12 So this notion that, you know, they're
13 head-to-head going after each other for the same
14 type of customers is really not supported by this
15 evidence and other evidence.

16 Q. Finally, by way of evidence, if you
17 have your written rebuttal testimony handy, I'd ask
18 you to turn to Page 56, please.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you make reference there in the
21 third paragraph down to a study performed by Bain &
22 Company for Universal Music.

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. What do you cite that for?

1 A. So first off, this is a -- you can see
2 there's a footnote there. This is an October 2014
3 Bain study that was done for Universal.

4 And I cite this for their conclusion
5 here on the slide that reads: "Lean back streaming
6 stealing share from terrestrial radio."

7 And they've some bar charts here to
8 show what's happened from 2011 to 2014. And what
9 you see there is Pandora growing significantly and
10 terrestrial radio declining.

11 So that's, you know, another piece of
12 empirical evidence supporting the proposition that
13 I've been developing the last few minutes that
14 Pandora and terrestrial radio are close
15 substitutes.

16 Q. Barring any questions from the judges,
17 let's -- on this topic, let's move to the sixth
18 topic in your written rebuttal testimony that we're
19 covering, which is what was labeled "Preservation
20 of Revenues."

21 So in your written rebuttal testimony,
22 beginning at page 47, you discuss what you term as
23 SoundExchange's preservation of revenues argument.

24 What are you addressing in that section
25 of your testimony?

1 A. This is the argument put forward by
2 some of SoundExchange's witnesses that the
3 Webcasting has caused a significant decline in
4 their record company revenues, and they need to
5 preserve those revenues in order to get a
6 reasonable rate of return and -- going forward.

7 Q. And have you analyzed that proposition?

8 A. Yes, I have.

9 Q. And what conclusions have you reached?

10 A. I think that it's simply not true as a
11 factual matter that Webcasting has caused a
12 significance decline in record company revenues.

13 I also think it is -- this will sound
14 familiar now -- disconnected from the benchmarking
15 exercise, by and large, for various reasons we can
16 talk about.

17 Q. And why don't we start with the second.

18 Why is it disconnected from -- by
19 "disconnected from," is that another way of saying
20 it should be irrelevant to the exercise?

21 A. That might be a little strong for me.

22 Q. All right.

23 A. But let's just say it doesn't take us
24 to -- it doesn't get us anywhere in the
25 benchmarking exercise by the way it's been

1 presented by SoundExchange.

2 Q. Why is that?

3 A. So as a starting point, revenues -- why
4 would you look at revenues -- if anything, you'd
5 look at profits. And the record company profits
6 are healthy, are higher than they've been in the
7 past.

8 And, of course, the difference between
9 revenues and profit is cost. So the starting point
10 of looking at revenues I think is mistaken. And
11 so -- for one thing.

12 And the other thing is there's no
13 economic law that says revenues can't fall for an
14 industry. Pretty -- pretty common, when the
15 Internet comes, actually, and there's some
16 disintermediation and from lower cost of
17 distribution, that we would expect revenues to
18 fall.

19 JUDGE STRICKLER: Question for you,
20 Professor. I understand what you're saying about
21 how the marketed would work and how revenues might
22 fall when a disruptive service comes in.

23 But if we look at Section 114 of the
24 statute, it says one of the things that we're
25 supposed to consider and therefore must consider --

1 congress telling us what to do -- is whether use of
2 the service may substitute for or may promote the
3 sale of phonorecords or otherwise or otherwise may
4 interfere with or may enhance the sound recording
5 copyright owners' other streams of revenue from its
6 sound recordings.

7 So while, in the -- an unregulated
8 market, not only not regulated by us but not
9 regulated by congress, we would say that's a
10 disruptive thing. We have competition, and maybe
11 revenues fall. Maybe the supply of sound
12 recordings available falls, and that's the market
13 working its own particular dynamics.

14 But since we have to be concerned with
15 it, don't we have to just focus in on whether and
16 to what extent the noninteractive services may
17 impact upon revenues.

18 A. Yes. Absolutely. So I think built
19 into all parts of my testimony is the notion that,
20 if a -- let's say Universal negotiates with
21 Pandora, just to make it specific. If Universal
22 believes correctly, let's say, that Pandora will
23 cannibalize other revenue streams, then Universal
24 would not be inclined to offer a very low rate to
25 Pandora. Doesn't pay for them. Okay?

1 That -- but you should totally take
2 that into account. And I am. Okay?

3 I'm -- what I'm saying here is the
4 decline in revenues -- I'm about to go through the
5 data -- that the record companies have experienced
6 is predominantly not the result of Webcasting.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: I understand that.
8 But you were making two points. So I wanted to
9 focus you on that latter point that you just made.
10 Because if noninteractive services were
11 causing the decline in revenue, we've got a
12 statutory obligation to consider that. And it's
13 your point, which may be the more important point
14 for us to consider, is whether or not that's
15 happening.

16 THE WITNESS: Well, okay. But let me
17 push on the other point, too, if I may, which is I
18 believe what's happening -- we're going to talk
19 about this more tomorrow -- is that Pandora and
20 iHeart are looking for direct licenses or looking
21 to activate competition in the statutory market, to
22 get better rates by shifting the music in the
23 direction of record companies that give them better
24 rates.

25 Let's suppose -- and I think this is

1 happening -- that that puts competitive pressure on
2 the record companies and also what causes the
3 revenues to fall.

4 I don't think you should be stopping
5 that -- I don't think you should -- how should I
6 put this? That would be, I would say, a natural
7 part of the workings of a competitive market, and
8 you should not close the door on that.

9 Now, at the same time, competition --
10 when Universal sits down and negotiates with
11 Pandora, and Pandora says, "Well, if you give us a
12 discount, we'll play your music more," Universal
13 could say, "Well, that's tempting, but actually I
14 think you cannibalize a lot of my other sales."
15 Suppose they thought that. They're going to say
16 no.

17 So we can account for competition and
18 at the same time properly account for this
19 cannibalization to the extent it's going on. And
20 that still may lead to a loss of revenues.

21 I think the market is showing signs of
22 becoming more competitive. And that will lead to a
23 loss of revenues even when all the sellers fully
24 account for the effect on their other revenue
25 streams.

1 JUDGE STRICKLER: So you can account
2 for cannibalization and adjust for the lack of
3 competition. They're not mutually exclusive.

4 THE WITNESS: And I'm going to argue
5 that the Merlin benchmark that we're going to be
6 presenting tomorrow is very good for that purpose.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: Thank you.

8 BY MR. RICH:

9 Q. So let's turn directly now to the basis
10 for your conclusion that the statutory Webcasting
11 services are not the primary reason for the decline
12 in record industry revenue.

13 That's what you cover extensively in
14 your written testimony of Pages 49 to 62. So could
15 you begin to summarize the highlight of that
16 analysis, please.

17 A. Yes. I think that easiest way to do
18 this is if Your Honors could turn to Slide 21. And
19 since it's late, but I think -- I'm hoping we can
20 get through this without having to cut it in parts.

21 The -- so this is taken from Professor
22 Rubinfeld's written direct testimony. I think the
23 -- everybody's using this RIAA data for the record
24 company revenues. And we see the peak in 1999.
25 And then it's come down a lot since then.

1 And this question came up, and I kind
2 of alluded to this when I was here last time. The
3 -- so just let me tell the story, and stop me if
4 you need to.

5 So if you look at the data here, what's
6 happened is, from the peak in 1999, I would draw --
7 I would flag for your attention what happens by
8 2010, which just look at that bar. That's
9 essentially all of the drop in revenues that we
10 looked at happened between 1999 and 2010.

11 And then you see the streaming, red
12 bars that are growing, of course. They're really
13 pretty small even by 2010.

14 Okay. And I have other evidence here
15 in the written rebuttal testimony indicating that
16 streaming just was not very much of a factor in the
17 overall market prior to 2010.

18 So I mentioned timing mismatch before
19 so -- when the question came up. So the vast
20 majority of the decline in revenues that the record
21 companies have experienced preceded the meaningful
22 growth of streaming.

23 So we're -- can be pretty sure, based
24 on that, that streaming -- and by the way, this
25 streaming here includes Webcasting and interactive.

1 It's both types -- did not cause this decline
2 because it came later.

3 Q. Have you reached a conclusion as to
4 what the primary drivers of that steep decline, in
5 fact, were?

6 A. I think there's -- it's very clear
7 there that piracy is the cause. The record
8 companies have understandably been deeply concerned
9 with piracy since the late '90s, probably earlier,
10 but particularly since that time. It's all over
11 the documents. I don't think it's disputed.

12 And it also, by the way -- one of the
13 reasons, my understanding -- is that the record
14 companies agreed to basically go with digital
15 singles through iTunes was to combat piracy as
16 well. That unbundling of the album further
17 contributed to the decline in revenues. But that
18 was ultimately caused by a combination of
19 technological change and piracy.

20 All of that clearly is not because of
21 streaming.

22 Q. So have you seen any empirical analysis
23 done by any of SoundExchange's witnesses that would
24 suggest that Webcasting has caused a decline in
25 record company revenues, not merely a correlation

1 but a causation demonstration?

2 A. Well, if we turn to the next slide,
3 this is, again, from Professor Rubinfeld's written
4 direct testimony where he sets side by side the
5 growth rates of streaming -- that's the blue, and
6 the streaming is growing year to year -- and the
7 shrinkage of the overall revenues -- that's the
8 red.

9 Now, let me be very clear because I did
10 hear Professor Rubinfeld on the witness stand. He
11 presented this in his written direct testimony.
12 And I'm responding to that.

13 I think he was -- said on -- when he
14 was here in the witness stand, in response to
15 questions, that he was not -- did not believe this
16 showed causation. Okay.

17 But he did present this chart, and I'm
18 responding to it.

19 Q. You mention in your rebuttal testimony
20 at Page 52 that this exhibit is highly misleading
21 in its portrayal of data.

22 Do you recall that?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. How is it misleading?

25 A. Well, I think the implication here to

1 visually look at this chart is to see streaming is
2 growing, quite nicely, in fact, and the overall
3 revenues are declining. And it certainly implies,
4 I would think to a normal viewer, that there's a
5 connection.

6 I think that that's not the case. And
7 one reason it's misleading is because it's only
8 percentage changes are shown here. Right? The
9 percentage growth of streaming, you know, 13.6
10 percent in 2009-'10, and the percentage decline in
11 overall revenue.

12 But if you look at the actual numbers,
13 look at them -- you get a very different picture.

14 Q. And you depict that in your Figure 9 on
15 the next page?

16 A. That's the next slide, Slide 23, Figure
17 9.

18 So this is exactly the same data,
19 exactly the same time period. And the red bars are
20 the decline of music revenues. So take 2009-'10.
21 The music industry -- from 2009 to 2010, revenues
22 decline by -- this says a billion dollars. These
23 are millions. So a thousand million -- it's a
24 billion dollars. Streaming grew by 83 million.
25 Okay?

1 Now, if you go back -- you know, that's
2 the same figure we had on the previous chart where
3 they look kind of comparable. They're not
4 comparable. The scales are completely different.

5 And it's even more dramatic if you look
6 at the earlier years where, as I said, the decline
7 of revenue prior to 2010 was dramatic, and
8 streaming was really a blip.

9 Q. Just to absorb this chart, to make sure
10 that everybody reads it the same way, the red bars
11 reflect total music revenue losses, correct?

12 A. Yes. I hope I was clear about that.

13 Q. And the blue bars reflect streaming
14 revenue gains; is that correct?

15 A. That's correct. Yes. Sorry if I was
16 unclear about that.

17 But the other thing -- so his figure,
18 that's the one piece of empirical analysis I've
19 seen that SoundExchange has put forward to --
20 regarding this connection or really lack of
21 connection, I'm telling you, between streaming and
22 the record companies' revenue decline.

23 The other thing --

24 Q. Let me just ask you, if I may, on
25 that --

1 A. Sorry.

2 Q. -- staying with that figure for a
3 minute.

4 Looking at 2010 forward where the blue
5 bars outstrip in the three reported years -- the
6 last three reported years the red bars, does that
7 indicate anything meaningful to you?

8 A. Yes. It does. But I think it's easier
9 to see if you go back to Slide 21. I mentioned
10 before that record company revenues had declined
11 quite dramatically actually from 1999 to 2010.

12 Since 2010, they've pretty much leveled
13 off. Not entirely. There's a small decline. But
14 they've pretty much leveled off. And you see this
15 in the documents as -- it's recognized as the
16 period in which revenues have stabilized. That's
17 the word, stabilized.

18 And so there's really two parts to what
19 I'm doing here. One is to say, from 1999 to 2010,
20 dramatic decline in revenues not caused by
21 streaming and not caused by Webcasting in
22 particular.

23 Then from 2010 to now -- although the
24 data we have here only goes through '13 -- but 2010
25 to now, revenues have stabilized.

1 And now I think we need to ask -- and
2 this is I think right along the lines of your
3 question, Judge Strickler, what's been going on
4 since 2010 when streaming is getting to be a bigger
5 deal? What impact is it having on the other
6 revenue streams of the record companies?

7 And that's going to come in to the
8 willing buyer, willing seller, cannibalization
9 issues in the world that we're seeing it more
10 recently. And, of course, we're trying to look
11 forward for another five years.

12 Q. And have you undertaken any further
13 investigation into that question, namely whether
14 statutory Webcasters did or didn't cause a decline
15 in record industry revenues over the time period
16 we've been examining?

17 A. So yeah. Because I look at that pretty
18 closely.

19 Q. And what have you looked at, and what
20 have you concluded from that?

21 A. So this is where we come back to a
22 point we were at I guess a half hour ago, which is
23 the primary effect of Webcasting in terms of how
24 people are spending their listening time -- we saw
25 it in those charts from Mr. Rosin -- it's adding to

1 new listening hours, and it's taking time away from
2 terrestrial radio. Okay?

3 Both of those are accretive to the
4 record companies. Because record companies don't
5 make any money on terrestrial radio listening. And
6 of course new listening is just gravy.

7 JUDGE STRICKLER: Did you find it at
8 all anomalous that, in Mr. Rosin's figures, he
9 found that 46 percent of the time -- replacement
10 time came from people who weren't listening to
11 music at all before? Looking at Slide 18.

12 THE WITNESS: Well, I wouldn't -- I
13 don't think it's people who weren't listening to
14 music. I think it's the extra time spent on
15 Pandora had previously not been listening time.

16 So I don't -- so, look, I can't swear
17 to the exact numbers. Okay. But I do see a lot of
18 people walking around with their phones with their
19 headphone on more than I used to. And mobile -- we
20 know mobile -- a large fraction of the listening
21 is -- on Pandora and the other services is mobile.

22 So I don't find it implausible that --

23 JUDGE STRICKLER: You're saying it's
24 people who might have been listening to music at
25 home or in the car, but when they walked around

1 previously, they weren't listening to music; and
2 now, given the mobile capacity, they have their
3 headphone on everywhere you go.

4 THE WITNESS: Exactly. Or they have a
5 little box playing music that streams.

6 So I think that's what we're picking up
7 in term -- and there are a lot of other pieces of
8 evidence, not just Mr. Rosin's survey here, that
9 indicates time spent listening -- you'll see TSL in
10 some of these documents -- has gone up.

11 And that's actually a historical trend.
12 Time spent listening has typically gone up and has
13 often been because of new technologies have come
14 along to make it more convenient. So I think
15 that's a chunk of what's going on.

16 I want to be very clear though. At the
17 same time, there is some degree of cannibalization
18 of other -- you know, there's some people, of
19 course, who are not buying CDs because they're
20 listening to Pandora. There are some people who
21 are not doing digital downloads.

22 So it's a mixture of these things. And
23 it's the net effect when you put all that together
24 that we're trying to explain. And I think we're
25 seeing revenue stabilization with streaming

1 contributing a lot to revenues now. They're
2 reducing some other the revenue streams but more
3 than making up for that in these two categories:
4 additional time spent listening and capture from
5 terrestrial radio.

6 BY MR. RICH:

7 Q. And in your written direct testimony,
8 you cite the direct license agreements in evidence
9 entered into by both Pandora and iHeartMedia as
10 further evidence to disapprove the cause of the
11 decline in record industry revenues attributable to
12 noninteractive services; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Could you explain that testimony?

15 A. So we have in -- let's take the -- the
16 Pandora-Merlin agreement is an example, but it's
17 not the only one.

18 We have others where -- supposedly you
19 see record companies going to statutory Webcasters
20 and saying, "All right. You play my music more,
21 and I'm not going to get much of any more money."

22 Professors Fischel and Lichtman do
23 calculations regarding the iHeart deals in this
24 respect. And I have the same structure in the
25 Pandora-Merlin deal where up to 12 and a half

1 percent more plays of the Merlin music on Pandora,
2 no extra money for Merlin.

3 So I love this type of evidence because
4 it's companies putting their mouth where their
5 mouth is in the sense why would the record
6 companies do that? Why would they say, "Play my
7 music more, but I don't need any more money."

8 They must value those plays. So at
9 last those incremental plays that we're seeing here
10 are net promotional. Okay? And that's what -- at
11 least in these instances, we have record companies
12 that their -- the deals they're cutting, their
13 actions speak directly to the net promotional
14 nature of Webcasting.

15 MR. RICH: Your Honors, the last topic
16 on the rebuttal side is Professor Shapiro's
17 analysis of the -- of Professor Rubinfeld's Apple
18 majors agreements.

19 I don't know what your preference is
20 about whether we continue that now or pick that up
21 in the morning.

22 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I think we have
23 to recess at this point.

24 MR. RICH: Okay.

25 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: And just a

1 heads-up. I do need to leave immediately tomorrow
2 at 4:15.

3 MR. RICH: Thank you.

4 MR. LARSON: Your Honors, we had
5 scheduled -- it wasn't on the letters that had been
6 sent, but Mr. Malone's client, Mr. Papish from
7 Harvard Radio, we had slotted him for last thing
8 tomorrow afternoon. And I know we're perhaps a
9 little behind already. And I'm not positive that
10 we're going to get to him, but we were hoping to
11 slide him in with Mr. Malone.

12 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Do you have an
13 estimate of how much time he will be on the stand?

14 MR. LARSON: Mr. Malone before had said
15 he thought 15 to 30 minutes, I think, for his
16 direct.

17 MR. POMERANTZ: We expect less than ten
18 minutes of cross.

19 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Well,
20 maybe there will be a break.

21 Will he be available earlier in the
22 day?

23 MR. LARSON: I don't know. I can check
24 with him. I think they're planning to come in in
25 the morning, but I'd have to check with him to see.

1 And I can send an e-mail to let you know if that is
2 helpful.

3 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Well, I think
4 we'll just have to kind of wait and see how the day
5 flows tomorrow. But I would like to get that taken
6 care of.

7 I also know that Professor Shapiro has
8 spent probably more time on airplanes and in
9 humidity than he is accustomed to.

10 We'll be at recess until 9:00.

11 (Whereupon, the proceeding was
12 adjourned at 4:33 p.m.)

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1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

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3 I, Bonnie L. Russo, do hereby certify that the
4 foregoing transcript is a true record of the
5 proceedings to the best of my ability, that I am
6 not related to or employed by any of the parties
7 involved in these proceedings, and, further, that I
8 am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
9 counsel employed by the parties hereto, or
10 financially interested in the proceedings.

11

12



Bonnie L. Russo

Bonnie Russo
Notary Public in and for
the District of Columbia

13

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15 My Commission Expires:

16 May 16, 2016

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